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I. INTRODUCTION
There are just not enough hours in the day to get the job done! This
is a common experience for many working adults, but this type of “time
drought” takes on democratic significance if the individuals experiencing
it are democratically elected officials.1 Those elected officials may thus
lack the ability to effectively represent the constituents who put them in
office.2 For federal elected officials, one of the causes of the lack of time
to craft policy (the job they are elected to do) is caused by political
fundraising burdens (the distraction).3 As one Congressman put it
bluntly: campaign fundraising has become an incredible “time suck” for
lawmakers.4
This Article will refer to several defined terms: “legislating” means
drafting legislation, participating in committee hearings, marking up
legislation, amending legislation on the floor, voting on legislation and
amendments to legislation, participating in conference committees, and
conducting oversight hearings.5 Legislating would also include meeting
with constituents, traveling home, corresponding with constituents, and
offering constituent services.6 For Senators, legislative duties would
include vetting executive and judicial appointments and ratifying
1
Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-raising: Why Campaign
Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281,
1312 (1994) (explaining how if candidates did not have to spend all of their time fundraising,
they would likely spend at least some of the free time in one’s home district, for example);
Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to Campaign
Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 33 (2014) (“The main problem of campaign
money on the federal level—aside from the huge time commitment for Members of Congress,
who spend so much time dialing for dollars that there is little time for legislative business—
is that it skews legislative priorities.”).
2
Mark C. Alexander, Let Them Do Their Jobs: The Compelling Government Interest in
Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected Officials, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 699, 706
(2006).
3
THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT WAS 67 (2012)
(“American elections are awash in money, politicians devote an inordinate amount of their
time dialing for dollars, and campaign fund-raising is now considered a normal part of the
lobbying process.”).
4
Congressman John Sarbanes, Remarks at Scholars Strategy Network: Purchasing
Power (June 17, 2016); see also Nick Penniman & Wendell Potter, Citizens United is Only
15% of the Political Cash Problem, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opini
on/op-ed/la-oe-penniman-potter-political-campaign-finance-reform-20160308-tory.html
(“As former Rep. Dan Glickman (D-Kan.), who later served as a lobbyist for the motion
picture industry, has opined: ‘The sad truth is . . . there simply isn’t enough time in the day to
stay competitive in campaign finance and do the actual job of policymaking.’”).
5
U.S. CONT. art. I, § 1; How Are Laws Made?, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, (last
visited May 10, 2018), https://www.house.gov/the-house-explained/the-legislative-process.
6
Juana Summers, Constituent Services Give Voters Something to Remember, NPR (Oct.
28, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/10/28/359615965/constituent-services-give-voters-so
mething- to-remember.
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treaties.7 Meanwhile, “fundraising” is the act of soliciting funds for a
political campaign or political party. 8 Fundraising would include inperson solicitation of money, and solicitation of money via broadcast,
mail, phone or email. “Fundraising” by itself does not fall into any of
this Author’s definitions of “legislating.” And this Author would argue
that ideally fundraising should take up a de minimis amount of an elected
Member of Congress’s time. But while many of the legislative functions
outlined in this paragraph are done by legislative staff who work for the
Member, strangely fundraising is often not delegated to a staff member,
but rather is the responsibility of the Member himself or herself.
Perhaps the clearest evidence that fundraising should not be
considered part of a Member’s job is the fact that it is literally illegal to
do the fundraising in a Congressional office where he or she otherwise
works.9 The fundraising cubicles set up for Members of Congress in
nearby office spaces for dialing for dollars have been called
“sweatshops.”10 Or as former Senator Alan Simpson recalled of his time
fundraising when he was a Senator, “‘I felt embarrassed. I thought it was
ugly . . . My staff kept saying, ‘You’ve got to go do it.’ You get a
Rolodex; you go outside the building for a whole day and dial numbers
of jerks you’ve never heard of in your whole life to get money out of
‘em.”11 Typically, the public does not get to sit in on Congressmen and
Congresswomen dialing for dollars, but in 2013 (a non-election year),
political reporter Ryan Lizza happened to overhear a freshman
Democratic Member of Congress doing call time in a public space for
7

Legislative Process, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/process.htm
(last visited May 10, 2018).
8
Fundraising for the Campaign, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/helpcandidates-and-committees/making-disbursements/fundraising-campaign/ (last visited May
10, 2018); Fundraising for other Candidates, Committees and Organizations, FED. ELECTION
COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/making-disbursements/fund
raising-other-candidates-committees/ (last visited May 10, 2018).
9
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, H.R. 2356, § 302, 107th Cong. (2002).
10
Nick Penniman & Wendell Potter, Nation on the Take: Dialing for Dollars in ‘D.C.’s
Sweatshops’, HUFF. POST (Apr. 27, 2016, 11:01 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/nickpenniman/nation-on-the-take-dialin_b_9787106.html (“Former representative Dennis
Cardoza, a California Democrat, compared his party’s call center to a sweatshop with thirtyinch-wide cubicles set up for the sole purpose of begging for money.”); see also Zach Wamp
(R-Tenn.), Refocusing our politics on the issues that matter, THE HILL (Jan. 8, 2018, 2:10
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/367937-refocusing-our-politics-on-theissues-that-matter (“Every freshman member of Congress packs their bags for Washington
already envisioning the more perfect republic they seek to build . . . . Where freshman
members expect to enter storied halls for deliberation, reason, and thought, they find a nonstop
call center.”).
11
Chris Lee, HBO’s John Oliver Exposes the Absurd and Awful Ways Congress
Members Raise Money, FORTUNE (Apr. 4, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/04/john-olivercongress-fundraising-money/ (quoting Senator Simpson).
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two and half hours straight. Mr. Lizza decided to live tweet what he
overheard from the Member’s side of the conversation. At the end of
listening to this multiple hour ordeal, Mr. Lizza concluded: “I now
understand the case for public financing of congressional elections.”12
This problem of fundraising-swamped lawmaking is particularly
acute post-Citizens United, the 2010 Supreme Court case that allows
corporations and unions to spend an unlimited amount on political
advertisements in American elections.13 Frequently, candidates need to
buy expensive television advertisement time and direct mail to
communicate with a vast electorate.14 Indeed, there is a lucrative cottage
industry to “help” candidates spend the money they have raised to
communicate with voters.15 The election in 2016 was the most expensive
federal election to date.16 This high price tag in 2016 is attributed to
Congressional races, as the spending on the 2016 Presidential race was
actually down compared to 2012.17 In the 2016 cycle, all candidates for
12
An Inside Look At Congressional Fundraising, THE GOV. AFF. INST. AT GEORGETOWN
U. (June 26, 2013), https://gai.georgetown.edu/an-inside-look-at-congressional-fundraising/
(quoting Ryan Lizza’s live tweeting of Congressional fundraising calls).
13
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010); Daniel P. Tokaji & Renata E. B.
Strause, The New Soft Money: Outside Spending In Congressional Elections, OHIO ST. U.
MORITZ C. OF L. 13 (2014), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/thenewsoftnioney/wp-content/uploads
/sites/57/2014/06/the-new-soft-money-WEB.pdf (“Some respondents, including a few
candidates, felt pressure to raise more money than ever before [Citizens United] and named
outside spending as the cause. This was particularly true where the respondent had a view
from the Senate side.”).
14
GLENN W. RICHARDSON JR., PULP POL. HOW POL. ADVERT. TELLS THE STORIES OF AM.
POL. 156 (2d ed. 2008) (“More broadly, the cost of [tv] advertising is implicated in the
incessant chase for campaign cash that preoccupies elected officials throughout their tenure
in office. No sooner have they won election than they must begin soliciting funds for their
next race. The result, some suggest, is an influence peddling bazaar, or as former U.S. Senator
Max Cleland once put it, a democracy ‘more like an auction than an election.’”); TED BRADER,
CAMPAIGNING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS HOW EMOTIONAL APPEALS IN POL. ADS WORK 13
(2006) (“Over the past half century in American politics, television ads have become the
principal tool of contemporary electioneering. Spending on ads accounts for the largest share
of the budget for almost all presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional campaigns.”).
15
Senator Richard G. Lugar (Ret.), Address at the Duke University Sanford School of
Public Policy: Embracing Governance over Partisanship (Feb. 12, 2013) (transcript available
at http://www.thelugarcenter.org/newsroom-events-51.html) (“But perhaps the most potent
force driving partisanship is the rise of a massive industry that makes money off of political
discord. This industry encompasses cable news networks, talk radio shows, partisan think
tanks, direct mail fundraisers, innumerable websites and blogs, social media, and gadfly
candidates and commentators. Many of these entities have a deep economic stake in
perpetuating political conflict. They are successfully marketing and monetizing partisan
outrage.”).
16
Ashley Balcerzak, UPDATE: Federal Elections to Cost Just Under $7 billion, CRP
Forecasts, CENT. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2
016/11/update-federal-elections-to-cost-just-under-7-billion-crp-forecasts/.
17
Cf. Center for Responsive Politics, 2016 Election Overview, OPEN SECRETS (May 18,
2017), https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/ (listing the cost of the 2016 presidential race
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the House raised $1,033,545,524 and all candidates for the Senate raised
$667,687,881.18 Thus, the primary focus of this Article will be on the
fundraising burdens experienced by incumbent Members of Congress.
This is not to argue, however, that Congressional challengers or
candidates for the Presidency are off the hook. All federal candidates,
except for those who can afford to self-finance a multi-million-dollar
race, are stuck on the same fundraising treadmill, and are consumed by
what has been euphemistically referred to as “call time.”
Retiring Republican Congressman Reid Ribble pointed the finger at
Citizens United as part of the problem telling 60 Minutes in 2016,
[i]f members would be candid, there’s a lot of frustration
centered around it. And some of this is the result of Citizens
United, the Supreme Court decision that opened up really
corporate dollars into the system. And so, if you want to have
your own voice, if you want your voice to be heard as
opposed to some outside group speaking for you, you
better—you
better do your job and raise enough money that
you can.19
Thus, in a post-Citizens United environment where outside political
spenders flourish, they need to raise funds to pay for the communication
with voters that they want in order for federal candidates to keep control
of their own message. And the data shows that while the amount of
fundraising for Congress has steadily gone up in each election cycle
between 2000 ($1 billion for all House and Senate candidates) and 2012
($1.9 billion for all House and Senate candidates); the cost has only
slightly dipped in 2014 and 2016 to a “new normal” of $1.7 billion for all
House and Senate candidates. The biggest jump in Congressional
fundraising dollars was in 2010. Whether this was caused by Citizens
United or only coincided with Citizens United is a matter of debate.

at $1,312,110,914), with Center for Responsive Politics, 2012 Election Overview, OPEN
SECRETS (July 15, 2013), https://www.opensecrets.org/ overview /index.php?display
=T&type=A&cycle=2012 (showing the cost for the presidential race in 2012 at
$1,372,896,499).
18
Center for Responsive Politics, 2016 Election Overview, OPEN SECRETS (Apr. 15,
2018). https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/.
19
Norah O’Donnell, Are Members of Congress Becoming Telemarketers?, CBS NEWS
(Apr. 24, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-are-members-of-congress-beco
ming-telemarketers/. (“Norah O’Donnell: Are you the only one who feels that way? Rep. Reid
Ribble: No. No.”).
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Fundraising by Candidates for Congress 2000-201620
All Candidates
House

2000
601,053,650

2002
$658,236,440

2004
$707,200,663

Senate
Total

$482,134,638
$1,083,188,288

$397,288,911
$1,055,525,351

$580,321,542
$1,287,522,205

All Candidates
House
Senate
Total

2006
$878,070,492
$646,141,715
$1,524,212,207

2008
$993,126,172
$499,354,330
$1,492,480,502

2010
$1,096,535,924
$824,399,235
$1,920,935,159

All Candidates
House
Senate
Total

2012
$1,095,278,481
$761,201,126
$1,856,479,607

2014
$1,026,176,171
$711,064,232
$1,737,240,403

2016
$1,033,545,524
$667,687,881
$1,701,233,405

Fundraising by incumbent Members of Congress who were up for
reelection showed a similar pattern. In 2000 all Congressional
incumbents raised $485 million and in 2016 all Congressional
incumbents raised $908 million. Incumbents certainly raised more
money after 2010’s Citizens United. Again, its exact role in causality is
debatable.
Fundraising by Incumbent Members of Congress 2000-201621
Members Only
House
Senate
Total

20

2000
$356,525,996
$129,469,197
$485,995,193

2002
$375,442,400
$132,742,417
$508,184,817

2004
$452,308,551
$170,694,789
$623,003,340

The source of this data is the Center for Responsive Politics’ Election Overview for
2000, 2002, 2004. 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 (https://www.opensecrets
.org/overview/index.php?display=T&type= A&cycle=2000). Select a new cycle date to see
the underlying data.
21
The source of this data is the Center for Responsive Politics’ Election Overview for
2000, 2002, 2004. 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 (https://www.opensecrets
.org/overview/index.php?display=T&type= R&cycle=2000). Select a new cycle date to see
the underlying data.
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Members Only
House
Senate

2006
$529,341,321
$276,385,202

2008
$577,082,977
$221,624,592

2010
$622,567,007
$231,114,120

Total

$805,726,523

$798,707,569

$853,681,127

Members Only
House
Senate
Total

2012
$652,359,834
$223,737,097
$876,096,931

2014
$632,538,085
$283,415,693
$915,953,778

2016
$645,225,227
$263,414,588
$908,639,815

Participating in the fundraising arms race is rational behavior for
most candidates because predictably the candidate with the bigger
campaign war chest wins the election.22 This fundraising treadmill leads
to deleterious effects including dependence on lobbyists for fundraising
assistance and for policy making, as well as an unhealthy reliance on a
small oligarchic subset of American political donors.23
Without public financing for Congressional candidates, the only
way to avoid the time suck of fundraising is to be independently

22

Bob Biersack, The Big Spender Always Wins?, OPEN SECRETS (Jan. 11, 2012),
https://www.opensecrets. org/news/2012/01/big-spender-always-wins/ (“It’s a bedrock truth
of money and politics: The biggest spender almost always wins . . . Even during the most
competitive cycles, when control of Congress is up for grabs, at the end of the day the
candidates who spend the most usually win eight of 10 Senate contests and nine of 10 House
races.”); Center for Responsive Politics, Money Wins Presidency and 9 of 10 Congressional
Races in Priciest U.S. Election Ever, OPEN SECRETS (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.opensecrets
.org/news/2008/11/money-wins-white-house-and/; see also Hearing on Campaign Finance
Reform Before the H. Committee on House Administration, 107th Cong. (May 1, 2002)
(statement of Rep. Christopher Shays: “We are in an arms race that is called the money race.
It is for real. It is not an imaginary thing. It is not getting better. It is getting worse.”).
23
Lee Drutman, The Political 1% of the 1% in 2012, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION (June 24,
2013, 9:00 AM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2013/06/24/1pct_of_the_1pct/ (“One sign of
the reach of this elite ‘1% of the 1%’: Not a single member of the House or Senate elected
last year won without financial assistance from this group. Money from the nation’s 31,385
biggest givers found its way into the coffers of every successful congressional candidate. And
84 percent of those elected in 2012 took more money from these 1% of the 1% donors than
they did from all of their small donors (individuals who gave $200 or less) combined.”); see
id. (“Overall, a total of 32 members of Congress (24 House members and eight Senators)
elected in 2012 got at least 25 percent of their total funds from 1% of the 1% donors. And 72
House members and 19 senators got at least 20 percent of their funds from these donors.”);
Derek Thompson, Why the GOP’s Dream of Tax Reform Is (Probably) Doomed, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/11/gop-taxcut/545450/ (“About 0.5 percent of the U.S. population makes up 68 percent of contributions
to political candidates, parties, or PACs, according to Open Secrets, a nonprofit that studies
political donations.”).
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wealthy.24 And yet, the Roberts’ Supreme Court seems particularly tone
deaf to arguments about preserving the ability of a non-wealthy
incumbent elected officials to do his or her official duties under Article I
of the Constitution.
This Article will first discuss how the current Supreme Court treats
arguments about candidates’ time; then it will explore how Members of
Congress conceptualize the burden of fundraising; next, it will look at
what data on fundraising reveals about who rises through the ranks in
Congress; then it will explain how cognitive scientists predict multitasking impacts effectiveness at work; and finally the piece will look at
how dialing for dollars often leads lawmakers to rely on wealthy donors
and lobbyists to finance their campaigns, who are all too eager to have an
impact on future policy choices.
II. THE CURRENT SHORTSIGHTED JURISPRUDENCE ON CANDIDATE TIME
In 1976, in Buckley v. Valeo, the seminal Supreme Court case that
has defined the contours of campaign finance law in the United States for
40 years, Justice Byron White offered a prophetic warning in dissent.
Justice White worried that by limiting campaign contributions and
leaving political expenditures unregulated in the post-Watergate reform
legislation known as the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA
1974”),25 the Supreme Court had thereby relegated political candidates to
an endless treadmill of campaign fundraising.26 Justice White was not a
jurist pontificating from idle conjecture when he wrote his admonition in
Buckley. Instead, Justice White was drawing on his own lived experience
as a fundraiser and campaigner for President John F. Kennedy’s
24

Daniel Weiss, Keeping the Money Coming, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS (May 16, 2011),
https://www.campaignsandelections.com/campaign/keeping-money-coming (responding to
the question, “[h]ow is the role of candidates themselves changing in fundraising? Do you
find that it’s a struggle to get them to devote the amount of face time or phone time with
potential donors that is necessary? . . . “Robichaud: At the end of the day, 90
percent of candidates try to avoid having to dial for dollars. They don’t like it; it’s like going
to the dentist for them. And so if they want to get out of fundraising, I usually tell them that
they have to write a big check to their campaign. That’s the only way they’re going to get
out of raising the money.”).
25
LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS THE PERSISTENCE OF
CORRUPTION IN AM. POL. 15 (1996) (“In its landmark ruling Buckley v. Valeo, the Court
eliminated expenditure limits as violations of first Amendment rights.”).
26
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 265 (1976) (White, J. concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“There is nothing objectionable indeed it seems to me a weighty interest in favor of
the provision in the attempt to insulate the political expression of federal candidates from the
influence inevitably exerted by the endless job of raising increasingly large sums of money.
I regret that the Court has returned them all to the treadmill.”); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC,
LOST HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 96 (2011) (quoting Josh
Rosenkranz) (“it[] was a system that turned ‘decent, honest politicians [into] junkies.’”).
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contentious 1960 election.27 Justice White’s concerns about the burdens
of fundraising were shared by President Kennedy, the man he helped
elect. After President Kennedy won the White House, he too “bemoaned
the ‘great financial burdens’ on campaigns due largely to the costs of
television advertising. It meant that candidates’ chances were largely
‘governed by their success as fundraisers.’”28
Two score and two years after Buckley, the day-to-day schedules of
America’s elected officials are evidence that Justice White’s prediction
in Buckley came true.29 Moreover, elected officials’ day-to-day
experiences should be reconsidered by the current Supreme Court as
having constitutional significance.30 The Justices need to, at long last,
realize that there is a compelling state interest in protecting incumbent
candidates’ time so that they have a chance to govern effectively. 31 The
Supreme Court must grapple with the “time drought” that incumbent
candidates experience when they lose precious hours in the day that
should be devoted to governing, but rather is spent dialing for dollars for
their next reelection campaigns.32
The last occasion that the U.S. Supreme Court considered the
“saving the candidates’ time” rationale for campaign finance reform, the
Court rejected it. This is a shame because the Court’s obstinacy on this
point prevents the Congress from enacting reforms that might cap the
amount political candidates could spend on an election, as well as
stymying public financing systems that include triggered matching
funds.33 The Court’s most recent opportunity to hear arguments about
27
Byron R. White, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/byron_r_white (last visited May
10, 2018).
28
JOHN NICHOLS & ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, DOLLAROCRACY, HOW THE MONEY AND
MEDIA ELECTION COMPLEX IS DESTROYING AMERICA 24 (2013) (quoting John F. Kennedy).
29
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Unstoppable Campaign Fundraisers, BRENNAN CENTER BLOG
(Oct. 3, 2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/unstoppable-campaign-fundraisers.
30
Usha R. Rodrigues, The Price of Corruption, 31 GA. L. J. & POL. (This Journal doesn’t
have an exact bluebook citation in the book – flagging for your decision on if to just leave it
like this) 45, 81 (2015) (“In the McCutcheon plurality’s view, a heightened responsiveness to
donors is a good thing. But the unstated cost of access is its flipside: the diminished voice of
non-donors. As Professor Vincent Blasi observes, campaign finance restrictions have created
a world that pressures candidates’ time in a manner that leaves little room for general
constituent service.”).
31
This Author is not the first to argue there is a compelling governmental interest in
protecting the time of candidates. See generally Alexander, supra note 2, at 699.
32
ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AM. FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO
CITIZENS UNITED 209 (2014) (“The unlimited spending [after Buckley] led to even more
candidate time fund-raising.”).
33
Campaign Finance Reform: Proposals Impacting Broadcasters, Cable Operators and
Satellite Providers: Hearing on the Shays-Meehan Campaign Finance Reform Bill Before the
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. On Telecommunications and the Internet,
107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Edward J. Markey, U.S. Congressman, Massachusetts: “I
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preserving candidates’ time occurred in a 2006 case called Randall v.
Sorrell in which the Justices considered the constitutionality of a
Vermont campaign law that mimicked the structure of the original
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (FECA 1974).
Vermont’s law had both low contribution limits and expenditure limits
(similar to FECA 1974).34 The Randall case was an attempt by litigants
to overturn Buckley v. Valeo from the left. It failed.
The Randall case was up on appeal from the Second Circuit, which
had “held that all of the [Vermont] Act’s contribution limits are
constitutional. It also held that the Act’s expenditure limits may be
constitutional. It found those limits supported by two compelling
interests, namely, an interest in preventing corruption or the appearance
of corruption and an interest in limiting the amount of time state officials
must spend raising campaign funds.”35 But the Supreme Court in Randall
reversed the appeals court, finding both Vermont’s contribution limits
unconstitutionally low and its expenditure limits impermissible according
to Buckley’s precedent.
In Randall, the Supreme Court also specifically rejected protecting
the candidate’s time as a compelling state interest stating: “[Vermont]
advance[s] as a ground for distinction a justification for expenditure
limitations that, they say, Buckley did not consider, namely, that such
limits help to protect candidates from spending too much time raising
money rather than devoting that time to campaigning among ordinary
voters. We find neither argument persuasive.”36 In particular, Justice
Breyer, writing for the Court in Randall stated:
In our view, it is highly unlikely that fuller consideration of
this time protection rationale would have changed Buckley’s
result. The Buckley Court was aware of the connection
between expenditure limits and a reduction in fundraising
time . . . . And, in any event, the connection between high
campaign expenditures and
increased fundraising demands
seems perfectly obvious.37
Thus, in a few short sentences, the Supreme Court brushed aside
concerns about the time candidates—especially incumbents—spend
fundraising instead of attending to other aspects of governing, or even
other aspects of campaigning like interacting face-to-face with a broad

have long supported public financing as a way to help limit the overall cost of campaigns and
to limit the amount of time and energy that politicians must exert in fundraising.”).
34
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801 (West 1997) (repealed 2013).
35
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 240 (2006) (referring to Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d
91 (2004)) (emphasis added).
36
Id. at 243.
37
Id. at 245-46.
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economic cross-section of voters.38 Consequently, because of Randall,
the Supreme Court would have to change its approach to recognize that
protecting a candidate’s time is a compelling state interest that could
justify a new campaign finance law as some federal Circuit Courts have
done before.39 Below, this Article discusses why Supreme Court Justices
and other judges throughout America should take the matter of a
candidate’s time more seriously. While 2006 is relatively recent, the
composition of the Supreme Court has changed. One Justice has died and
two Justices have retired. As a result, three new Justices have joined:
Justices Kagan, Sotomayor and Gorsuch. Each could offer an entirely
new perspective.
III. FEDERAL ELECTED OFFICIALS ARE WATCHING THEIR DAYS TICK
AWAY AS THEY FUNDRAISE

As is evident from the position of the Supreme Court in Randall and
Buckley, Article III judges can be dismissive of just how time-consuming
fundraising has become. One possible reason for this lack of empathy
across the co-equal branches of government is that Article III judges
never face elections and enjoy lifetime appointments. And it is possible
that just like members of the general public, judges may misperceive the
scope of the problem. Polling in 2017 revealed that Americans believed
the average Members of Congress spent only ten hours a week
fundraising—this is a considerable underestimate.40
But what do elected Article I office holders think about the
fundraising burden? Many legislators are on the record despising the
practice and the frustration is bipartisan. For instance, in the Summer of
2016, Democratic Congressman John Sarbanes addressed the Ford
Foundation.41 Congressman Sarbanes lamented about what he called “the
38

The Supreme Court was not alone in discounting arguments about candidates’ time.
See Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 916-17 (6th Cir. 1998) (“The need to spend a
large amount of time fundraising is a direct outgrowth of the high costs of campaigns.
However, because the government cannot constitutionally limit the cost of campaigns, the
need to spend time raising money, which admittedly detracts an officeholder from doing her
job, cannot serve as a basis for limiting campaign spending.”).
39
Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1553 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he State seeks to
promote. . .a diminution in the time candidates spend raising campaign contributions, thereby
increasing the time available for discussion of the issues and for campaigning. It is well
settled that [this] government interest [is] compelling.”); see also Vote Choice, Inc. v.
DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir. 1993).
40
Sarah Kleiner, Democrats Say Citizens United Should Die. Here’s Why That Won’t
Happen, TIME (Aug. 31, 2017), http://time.com/49225/democratscitizenunited/ (“According
to the Center for Public Integrity-Ipsos poll, 58 percent of respondents believe congressional
members spend 10 hours or less a week fundraising. But members, on average, spend 20-to30 hours per week fundraising, according to research by Issue One.”).
41
Congressman John Sarbanes, Remarks at Scholars Strategy Network: Purchasing
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time suck” caused by the magnitude of political fundraising he had to do
on a regular basis. In other words, the time Congressman Sarbanes spent
raising campaign cash was time he could not meet with a constituent,
attend a committee hearing to mark-up legislation, or even cast a vote on
the floor of Congress—presumably all the actions his constituents elected
him to do. Also, in 2016, Republican Congressman Walter Jones
similarly stated in an interview, “[e]verything has gotten out of hand up
here. It’s all about raising money.”42
A. Pre-Citizens United Fundraising
House Minority Leader Robert Michel once described having to
attend at least five fundraisers a night.43 Now of course, each lawmaker
will have his or her own fundraising routine. Some will spend more time
fundraising, either because they enjoy the process, or because they feel
that they will not be reelected without it. Others, who loathe the practice
or are lucky enough to hold a “safe seat,” may do less of it. 44 Without a
comprehensive survey across all candidates, no one can know with any
certainty that the stories about fundraising that end up in the press are
representative or outliers. One reform that would be helpful to voters and
researchers alike is requiring members of Congress to report exactly how
much time they spend fundraising.45
Political spending on federal campaigns has grown since the 1980s.
One study found that campaign spending between 1984 and 2012 had
grown a jaw dropping 555%.46 Consequently, the fundraising time
Power (June 17, 2016).
42
Michael Beckel, Meet The GOP Congressman Who Wants To Overturn ‘Citizens
United’ Walter Jones Says Fundraising Has ‘Gotten Out Of Hand’ In Washington, CENT. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2016/01/21/19154/meet-gop
-congressman-who-wants-overturn-citizens-united.
43
Alexander, supra note 2, at 676 (“The time you spent raising money, and the number
of fund-raising events I was obligated to attend or at least stop by—gosh, you’d have five or
six a night. It just wears on you.”).
44
MARTIN SCHRAM, SPEAKING FREELY: FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TALK ABOUT
MONEY IN POLITICS 18 (1995) (quoting Sen. Wyche Fowler (D-Georgia): “I’ve had this
discussion with my colleagues. They say, ‘Goddammit, I’ve got to go ask these people, and
if I ask them, what are they going to ask of me?’ . . . There are exceptions—some [members]
who love to raise money, love to schmooze with those that give.”).
45
Brent Ferguson, Congressional Disclosure of Time Spent Fundraising, 23 CORNELL J.
OF L. AND PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2013) (“The simplest version of such a law . . . is a requirement
that legislators disclose the amount of time they spend fundraising . . . . Making the
information accessible to the public would increase awareness of the volume of fundraising
that occurs, perhaps spurring more calls for change.”).
46
Michael Scherer, Pratheek Rebala, & Chris Wilson, Campaign Inflation Calculator,
TIME (Oct. 23, 2014), http://time.com/3534117/the-incredible-rise-in-campaign-spending/
(“Since the mid-1980s, the amount dumped on elections by campaigns and outside groups, as
measured by the Federal Election Commission, has grown 555 percent—faster than even the
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crunch has been festering for decades. As conservative political scientist
Larry Sabato warned two decades ago, the scandalous nature of
fundraising has become routinized and normalized through repetition:
[S]candal has become so routine that it no longer seems
scandalous. Donations of $1 million or more in obvious
protection money from individuals and corporations whose
motives are no more noble than [convicted fraudster Charles]
Keating’s are no longer news . . . and financiers . . . cynically
lard the coffers of both political parties so that
they will come
out on top no matter who wins at the polls.47
In the mid-1990s, Martin Schram gathered quotes about campaign
finance from individuals who recently retired from serving in Congress,
both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. Several
Representatives and Senators that spoke to Mr. Schram highlighted the
problem of the time-consuming nature of political fundraising for
incumbents. For instance, Senator Dennis DeConcini reported, “[t]he
worst thing about it is that members have to spend so much time in the
pursuit of campaign finances that I think their ability to do really their
best as legislators is jeopardized. And I’m a good example . . . [y]ou are
constantly out there grazing [for money].”48
Senator Howard
Metzenbaum did not mince words about how much he detested
fundraising. Senator Metzenbaum reported to Mr. Schram:
If there’s $7.5 million. . .and if you did get $1,000 from every
person, it would be 7,500 individuals that you had to talk to
convince to send $1,000. Follow up to send thank-yous . . .
hours upon hour . . . . You’d like to be spending your time on
legislation—on the floor of the Senate, in committees, with
staff, deciding what other projects you want to be involved
in . . . . It becomes49very time-consuming, very arduous. And
a pain in the butt.
And Congressman Vin Weber noted, in a similar vein to Mr.
Schram, “I do think that the amount of time people have to put into raising
money is a serious problem in the country . . . . There’s no way you can
prove its impact on the quality of the Congress’s work . . . . But when the
members making decisions can’t devote serious quality time to serious
decisions, it has to [result in] a lower quality of work.”50 Others like
Congressman Mel Levine who ran for a Senate seat were more certain
that fundraising had negatively impacted their job performance. As
Congressman Levine related, “I did raise a lot of money, particularly in
my Senate race, and it just drained my time and ability to do anything

alarming increases in the costs of health care and private college tuition.”).
47
SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 25, at 24.
48
SCHRAM, supra note 44, at 40 (quoting Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona)).
49
SCHRAM, supra note 44, at 43 (quoting Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)).
50
SCHRAM, supra note 44, at 38 (quoting Rep. Vin Weber (R- Minnesota)).
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else. It just crippled my ability to do my job properly in my final
term . . . .”51 Congressman Jim Bacchus agreed that fundraising could
get in the way of legislating, arguing “while all of this [fundraising] is
going on, you’re not reading pending legislation. And you’re not doing
what you were elected to do.”52
Having legislative work bend around fundraising was a problem
noted by former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell whose job
included setting the Senate’s schedule:
One of the most common reasons [for a request to reschedule
a floor vote by a Senator] is that they are either holding or
attending a fund-raising event . . . . If I put all the requests
together, the Senate would never vote. I once had my staff
keep a list of such requests on one day . . . and had I honored
all the requests, there could not have been a vote that
day. It
covered the period from nine a.m. until midnight.”53
Thus, if fundraising was allowed to pause all legislative functions, it
could debilitate the legislative branch of the government.
The new millennium’s technologies like the Internet54 did not stop
the fundraising treadmill for Members of Congress. 55 The public knows
this because lawmakers have testified under oath about the impact of the
continued fundraising burdens. For example, in 2001 Congressman Tom
Sawyer testified: “[t]his incessant money chase that everybody has
referred to, to fund ever more costly campaigns diverts members’
attention from important duties and diminishes public trust. Members of
the House today operate in a state of perpetual campaigning.”56 In 2002,
only a year later, Congressman Richard Gephardt testified that:
I have talked with colleagues on both sides of the aisle about
51

SCHRAM, supra note 44, at 42 (quoting Rep. Mel Levine (D-California)).
SCHRAM, supra note 44, at 45 (quoting Rep. Jim Bacchus (D-Florida)).
53
SCHRAM, supra note 44, at 37-38 (quoting Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell
(D-Maine)).
54
Weiss, supra note 24 (responding to the question, “[a]s fundraisers, what do you see
as your major challenges approaching the 2012 campaign cycle?” . . . Linder: . . . one of the
observations that I’ve had with online fundraising is it is absolutely not a panacea. You still
have to have a hot candidate or a hot cause to get people to respond to an e-mail or drive
themselves to a website to make a donation. People just don’t go looking for reasons to make
political contributions . . . . Fundraising is still turning over rocks—creating that relationship,
whether it is by mail, through events, or through personal calls.”).
55
Brandon Lewis, Why Candidates Hate Fundraising, CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS (Oct.
1, 2013), https://www.campaignsandelections.com/campaign-insider/why-candidates-hatefundraising. (“Fundraising is the one area of campaigning that consistently and continually
offers a steady stream of rejection, refusal and dismissal from friends, associates and total
strangers.”).
56
Campaign Finance Reform: Proposals Impacting Broadcasters, Cable Operators and
Satellite Providers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and the Internet of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 11 (2001) (statement of Rep. Tom Sawyer,
Member, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce).
52
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this endless chase for more and more money. The creative
energies of our best and brightest public servants in both
parties are invariably being directed towards keeping up in
order to be competitive and raise more and more money to
get there. Our focus should be on addressing and solving the
problems that confront the American people, not meeting
quarterly fund-raising goals.
This is the politics of mutually
assured destruction . . .57
And yet, since Congressman Gephardt’s remarks, fundraising
pressures for incumbents have likely worsened because the Supreme
Court has loosened restrictions on campaign finance laws since 2006.58
B. Post-Citizens United Fundraising
In addition to the 2006 Randall decision highlighted above, one of
the key deregulatory decisions from the Roberts Supreme Court was the
2010 Citizens United v. FEC ruling.59 It was quickly followed with
Bennett and McCutcheon, which further deregulated the rules governing
money in politics.60 Notably, Citizens United is about independent
spending and not the direct contributions that is the focus of this Article.
However, the impact of post-Citizens United independent spending is an
increased pressure on candidates to fundraise so that they can get out their
own message among the din of newly empowered spenders like Super
PACs.61 As Lee Drutman explained, “So in the post-Citizens United
campaign finance environment of unlimited outside spending, not only
do members running for reelection have to commit seemingly endless
hours in the unpleasant uphill battle of begging rich people for money,
but their efforts can instantly be dwarfed by outside spending (from even
richer people) that will then shape the contours of the race by running ads
57
Campaign Finance Reform: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on H. Admin., 107th Cong.
5 (2002) (statement of Rep. Richard Gephardt, Minority Leader, H.R.).
58
Randall, 548 U.S. at 230 (invalidating Vermont’s contribution and expenditure limits);
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (narrowing the definition of
electioneering communications); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (invalidating the
millionaire’s amendment); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (invalidating the ban
on corporate political expenditures); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,
131 S.Ct. 2806 (2011) (invalidating the triggered matching funds in Arizona’s public
financing system); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (invalidating an aggregate
limit for individual donations).
59
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310. FN 59-61 belong on the previous page.
60
Bennett, 546 U.S. at 753; McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462.
61
Lee Drutman, The Political 1% of the 1% in 2012, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION (June 24,
2013), https:// sunlightfoundation.com/2013/06/24/1pct_of_the1pct/ (“In the first presidential
election cycle since the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC, candidates got
more money from a smaller percentage of the population than any year for which we have
data, a new analysis of 2012 campaign finance giving by the Sunlight Foundation shows.
These donors contributed 28.1 percent of all individual contributions in the 2012 cycle, a
record high.”).
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‘independent’ of the candidates.”62
The cost of elections has increased markedly between 2006 when
Randall was decided and 2016. According to the Center for Responsive
Politics, in 2006, the total cost of Congressional races was
$2,852,658,140, but this cost shot up to $4,057,519,568 in 2016 with new
Super PAC spending included.63 In 2006, the typical winner in a House
seat spent $1.2 million.64 And in 2016, the typical winner in a House seat
spent $1.5 million.65 So how dire is the “time suck” problem since
Citizens United?66 That difference may not seem large, but recall that the
additional $300,000 must be raised within the hard money limits of
$2,100 to $2,700 per donor (depending on the year). Not surprisingly,
many political donors have reported amplified pressure to contribute over
this time frame.67 Yet one limited survey in 2013 of twenty-five members
of the House found that these members spent less than twenty percent of
their time fundraising, or roughly a single day a week.68 But again, this
62
Lee Drutman, Why So Many Members Of Congress Are Retiring: It’s A Miserable Job,
And Campaigning For It Is Awful, VOX (Feb. 1, 2018, 11:40 AM), https://www.vox.com
/polyarchy/2018/2/1/16958988/congress-members-retiring-why.
63
Cost of Election, CENT. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (https://www.opensecrets.org/overview
/cost.php) (last visited May 10, 2018).
64
Election Trends, CENT. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (2006), https://www.opensecrets.org/
overview/election-trends.php?cycle=2006 (last visited May 10, 2018).
65
Michael J. Malbin, Does The Opening Predict A Wave?, BROOKINGS (July 24, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu /blog/fixgov/2017/07/24/does-the-opening-predict-a-wave/.
66
JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE
RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 313-14 (2016) (“. . .the 2012 election was a tipping point of sorts.
Not only was it by far the most expensive election in the country’s history; it was also the first
time since the advent of modern campaign-finance laws when outside spending groups,
including super PACs and tax-exempt nonprofit groups, flush with unlimited contributions
from the country’s richest donors, spent more than $1 billion to influence federal elections.
And when the spending on attack ads run by nonprofits was factored in, outside spending
groups might well have outspent the campaigns and the political parties for the first time.”).
67
Monica Youn, The Fair Elections Now Act: A Comprehensive Response to Citizens
United, BRENNAN CENT. FOR JUST. (Apr. 12, 2011), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/
fair-elections-now-act-comprehensive-response-citizens-united. (“According to an October
2010 poll by the Committee for Economic Development, 48% of business leaders state that
the level of pressure placed on them to make political contributions has increased since 2008,
with 28% saying it has ‘increased a lot.’”).
68
Life in Congress: The Member Perspective, CONG. MGMT. FOUND. & SOC’Y FOR
HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT. 19 (2013), http://www.congressfoundation.org/storage/docum
ents/CMF_Pubs/life-in-congress-the-member-perspective .pdf (“The finding that may
surprise some observers is that Members are spending less than 20% of their time in an
average week on political and campaign activities (which includes fundraising and attending
campaign events in Washington, D.C., and in the district).”); but see David Hawkings, Dialing
for Dollars: The Other Money Matter on Their Minds This Week, ROLL CALL (Mar. 18, 2013),
http://www.rollcall.com/news/hawkings/dialing-for-dollars-the-other-money-matter-on-thehills-mind-this-week#sthash.bzKtuyZV.dpuf (commenting on the Life in Congress report:
“[When fundraising time was] [c]ombined with the hours devoted to media relations, the
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sample may not be representative of the average Member of Congress.
By contrast, The Boston Globe in a 2013 article about freshman Members
of Congress reported: “‘It may not be exactly like the Bataan Death
March, but there are some similarities,’ said one freshman representative
who did not want to speak on the record for fear it would harm his
campaign.”69
Again, there is not a comprehensive survey that would provide a
definitive answer regarding how much the average Members of Congress
spends on fundraising, but we do have limited evidence from the press.
Recent press reports of leaked fundraising memos and power points have
revived the issue of just how much time is spent by federal candidates on
fundraising.70
If technologies, such as emailed campaign solicitations, were
supposed to solve the problem of the candidate fundraising burden, they
have not.71 President Barack Obama’s experience shows that emailed
solicitations are made in addition to, not instead of, other methods of
appeals. On top of the prodigious number of emails from the Obama
campaign soliciting funds from potential donors, during his reelection
campaign in 2012 President Obama attended over 200 fundraisers.72 One
political reporter did the math and found that during the 2012 election
President Obama was at a fundraiser once every sixty hours during the

numbers grew to 26 percent of time spent on self-promotion when in Washington and 32
percent allocated that way in their districts.”).
69
Tracy Jan, For Freshman in Congress, Focus is on Raising Money, BOSTON GLOBE
(May 12, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/05/11/freshman-lawmake
rs-are-introduced-permanent-hunt-for-campaign-money/YQMMMoqCNxGKh2h0tOIF9H/st
ory.html; see also Life in Congress: The Member Perspective, CONG. MGMT. FOUND. & SOC’Y
FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT. 19 (2013) (quoting Rep. Tim Walz (D- MN)) (“‘Unfortunately
in the era of Citizens United fund-raising is a part of life, but the needs of your district and
advocating for constituents always come first.’”).
70
Ryan Grim & Sabrina Siddiqui, Call Time For Congress Shows How Fundraising
Dominates Bleak Work Life, HUFF. POST (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/
2013/08/retiring-rodney-alexander-congressman-fundraising-congress/ (stating that four
hours a day of call time and an hour a day for fundraisers); Andy Kroll, Retiring GOP
Congressman: Fundraising Is “The Main Business” of Congress, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 8,
2013 3:02 PM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/08/retiring-rodney-alexander-co
ngressman-fundraising-cong.
71
Seth Grossman, Creating Competitive and Informative Campaigns: A Comprehensive
Approach to “Free Air time” for Political Candidates, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y R. 351, 381
(2004) (“Moreover, unlike traditional, in-person fundraising, Internet fundraising does not
require massive investments of candidate time and thus allows candidates to direct attention
to other matters, like meeting with voters and discussing their campaign positions.”).
72
Andy Kroll, Obama Has Attended, On Average, One Fundraiser Every 60 Hours
While Running for Reelection, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 13, 2012 1:57 PM), http://www.mother
jones.com/mojo/2012/08/obama-200-fundraisers-romney-record (stating that Obama held
203 fundraisers by August 2012).

TORRES-SPELLISCY

288

2018

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

campaign.73 In his book, The Rise of the President’s Permanent
Campaign, author Brendan J. Doherty found this number was more than
President Obama’s five predecessors combined.74 President Obama
complained about fundraising in his final State of the Union Address in
2016, noting wryly: “We have to reduce the influence of money in our
politics, so that a handful of families or hidden interests can’t bankroll
our elections. And if our existing approach to campaign finance reform
can’t pass muster in the courts, we need to work together to find a real
solution—because it’s a problem. And most of you don’t like raising
money. I know; I’ve done it.”75
Current Members of Congress are not spared the rigors of
fundraising that President Obama experienced as an incumbent. If
anything, Members of the House experience it on a more regular basis
because they seek reelection every two years, compared to the four-year
presidential cycle. House Members are stuck in the “permanent
campaign” too.76 Additionally, the ability to fundraise has a significant
correlation with advancement into Congressional leadership.77 The New
York Times noted in an op-ed about the experiences of Congressman
Steve Israel:
“It’s horrific,” Representative Steve Israel of New York
admitted this week in announcing his retirement after eight
terms. “I don’t think I can spend another day in another call
room making another call begging for money,” he said. He
estimated he has spent 4,200 hours in call rooms, plus 1,600
more at 78fund-raising dinners, raising $20 million in
donations.
73
Id.; see also MAYER, supra note 66, at 322 (“[Obama’s 2012] campaign began
encouraging supporters to give to the pro-Obama super PAC, Priorities USA . . . . Obama
admitted that he suffered ‘from the same original sin of all politicians, which is: We’ve got to
raise money.’”).
74
Brendan J. Doherty, Fundraiser in Chief, BALTIMORE SUN (Nov. 4, 2012),
http://www.baltimoresun. com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-fundraising-20121104-story.html.
75
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 13, 2016) (transcript
available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepressoffice/2016/01/12/remarks-pres
ident-barack-obama-%E2%%93-prepared-delivery-state-union-address).
76
Emily C. Singer, What If We Didn’t...Have Endless Political Campaigns?, MIC (Apr.
10, 2018), https://mic.com/articles/188447/what-if-we-didnt-have-endless-political-campaig
ns#.Ch1ZLoPHm (quoting former Rep. Israel) (“But now you’re in a permanent campaign,
and you go to Congress and you get nothing done. That’s what’s motivating so many
retirements [from Congress].”).
77
LESSIG, supra note 26, at 94 (“[N]ow, in both parties, leaders were chosen at least in
part on their ability to raise campaign cash. Leading fund-raisers became the new leaders.
Fund-raising became the new game.”).
78
Editorial Board, Beggars Banquet in Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2016),
http://www.nytimes .com/2016/01/07/opinion/beggars-banquet-in-congress.html?smid=twshare; see also Carl Hulse, Steve Israel of New York, a Top House Democrat, Won’t Seek Reelection, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/us/politics/steve-
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Congressman Israel also told 60 Minutes: “[a]nd that’s the way it
went until 2010, when Citizens United was enacted. At that point,
everything changed. And I had to increase that to two, three, sometimes
four hours a day, depending on what was happening in the schedule.”79
The reaction from some 60 Minutes viewers to this episode was decidedly
negative.80
Senators cannot avoid the rigors of constant fundraising even though
they serve six-year terms.81 Indeed, a leaked 2014 midterm election
memo to a U.S. Senate candidate raised eyebrows when it suggested that
the candidate should spend 80% of her time fundraising.82 Although, the
Senate candidate was running for an open seat and had no existing
constituency obligations at the time, it is staggering to conceive that
eighty percent of the candidate’s time should go to fundraising instead of
meeting voters, holding public events, debating or formulating policy
positions. Also troubling was a claim by former Senate Majority Leader
Tom Daschle in 2014 that Senators spend “two-thirds” of their time on
fundraising in the last two years of their terms.83 And as sitting Senator
Chris Murphy explained to Reuters: “It’s important for us to expose the
ugliness of political fundraising, because people are not going to care
about this issue if we continue to pretend like it isn’t a big part of our

israel-house-democrat-new-york.html?_r=1 (“I don’t think I can spend another day in another
call room making another call begging for money,” Mr. Israel said in an interview in his
congressional office. “I always knew the system was dysfunctional. Now it is beyond
broken.”).
79
O’Donnell, supra note 19 (quoting Rep. Steve Israel).
80
Evie Salomon, Viewers call out Congress for “Dialing for Dollars,” 60 MINUTES
(Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/viewers-call-out-congress-for-dialing-fordollars/ (“‘If you think you couldn’t hate Congress any more than you already do, turn on 60
Minutes right now,’ one viewer tweeted[.]”).
81
BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 94-95 (2002) (“To get big gifts politicians not only must solicit big
givers. They must do it themselves and cannot afford to delegate the job to professional fundraisers. When speaking privately, they can make all sorts of assurances to big donors without
saying anything blatantly criminal like ‘give me $100,000 and I’ll vote for your tax break.’
The very fact that Senator X is spending a whole hour in private conversation with the donor
attests to the seriousness of his concerns, making such blatant illegalities unnecessary.”).
82
Paul Blumenthal, Leaked Memo Tells Senate Candidate to Spend 80 Percent of her
Time Raising Money, HUFF. POST (July 28, 2014, 5:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2014/07/28/michelle-nunn-fundraising_n_562 8018. html; Memorandum from Diane
Feldman to Michelle Nunn (Dec. 9, 2013) (https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/235287519
?access_key=key7XLZhUlmcqs8zb0ft3xs&allow_share=true&escape=false&view_mode=s
croll).
83
Shane Goldmacher, Former Senate Leader Says Senators Spent Two-Thirds of Time
Asking for Money Huge campaign needs drive senators up for reelection to put most of their
time into raising cash, NAT’L J. (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/63463
/former-senate-leader-says-senators-spent-two-thirds-time-asking-money.
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lives[.]”84
But perhaps equally troubling was a leaked memo from 2013 to
freshman House Democrats that suggested they spend between 40% and
50% of their time on fundraising.85 This practice also appears to be
happening on the other side of the aisle, as well. As then-freshman
Republican Congressman David Jolly noted after he won a special
election, the first order of business was not working on legislation, but
rather it was fundraising for the next election: “[w]e sat behind closed
doors at one of the party headquarter back rooms in front of a white board
where the equation was drawn out. You have six months until the
election. Break that down to having to raise $2 million in the next six
months. And your job, new member of Congress, is to raise $18,000 a
day.”86
Congressman Jolly also noted that the work schedules for Members
of Congress have bowed around fundraising: “You never see a committee
working through lunch because those are your fundraising times. And
then in between afternoon votes and evening votes, that is when you can
see Democrats walking down this street, Republicans walking down that
street to spend time on the phone making calls.”87
Congressman Rick Nolan worried in 2016 that the rigors of
84
Andy Sullivan, Insight: In Washington, lawmakers’ routines shaped by fundraising,
REUTERS (June 12, 2013, 2:46 AM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-fundra
ising-insight/insight-in-washington-lawmakers-routines-shaped-by-fundraising-idUSBRE95
B05520130612 (quoting Senator Murphy).
85
Ryan Grim & Sabrina Siddiqui, Call Time For Congress Shows How Fundraising
Dominates Bleak Work Life, HUFF. POST (Dec. 6, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013
/01/08/call-time-congressional-fundraising-n2427291.html (“A PowerPoint presentation to
incoming freshmen by the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, obtained by The
Huffington Post, lays out the dreary existence awaiting these new back-benchers. The daily
schedule prescribed by the Democratic leadership contemplates a nine or 10-hour day while
in Washington. Of that, four hours are to be spent in ‘call time’ and another hour is blocked
off for ‘strategic outreach,’ which includes fundraisers and press work.”); LEE DRUTMAN, THE
BUS. OF AM. IS LOBBYING, HOW CORP. BECAME POLITICIZED AND POL. BECAME MORE
CORPORATE 236 (2015) (“Members of Congress spend far too much time fundraising. As the
costs of campaigns continue to rise, members of Congress spend more and more hours a day
in ‘call time.’ Increasingly, the main qualification for the job is having a unique personality
trait that allows one to withstand several hours a day of begging rich people for money.”).
86
O’Donnell, supra note 19 (quoting Rep. David Jolly). For a similar experience from
another Florida Congressman, see SCHRAM, supra note 44, at 44 (quoting Rep. Jim Bacchus
(D-Florida)) (“Someone like me, in a very marginal seat, begins thinking about reelection a
day or so after he is sworn in for a new term—if he wants to get reelected.”).
87
O’Donnell, supra note 19 (quoting Rep. David Jolly); see also Rep. Gephardt
expressing similar concerns in 2002; see also Hearing on Campaign Finance Reform Before
the H. Committee on House Administration, 107th Cong. 4 (May 1, 2002) (statement of
Richard Gephardt, U.S. Congressman, Missouri: “Let us decide today that this next election
will be conducted differently than in the past; that the focus will be on debating the issues
rather than on fundraising schedules. . .”) (emphasis added).
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fundraising were getting out of control with freshman Members of
Congress who had been encouraged to spend half their time on
fundraising and that it could discourage new candidates from trying their
hand at politics stating, “both parties have told newly elected members of
the Congress that they should spend 30 hours a week in the Republican
and Democratic call centers across the street from the Congress, dialing
for dollars.”88 Congressman Nolan continued, comparing Congressional
call time to professional telemarketing, “30 hours a week, that’s a lot of
telemarketing. Probably more than most telemarketers do.”89 And
Members of Congress that represent districts on the West Coast must
juggle call time with travel time. One reported to the L.A. Times that she
takes red-eye flights from California to be in DC to arrive in time for call
time.90 Or as former Governor of Minnesota Arne Carlson and former
Member of Congress from Minnesota Gerald Sikorski summed up the
impact of excessive fundraising: “The ability for Congress—and our
country—to lead on the world stage is now at stake because we have a
part-time Congress in a full-time world.”91
IV. WHAT DOES THE DATA ABOUT FUNDRAISERS REVEAL?
As discussed above, there are numerous anecdotes, typically from
retiring Members of Congress complaining about the fundraising burden

88

O’Donnell, supra note 19 (quoting Rep. Rick Nolan).
O’Donnell, supra note 19 (quoting Rep. Rick Nolan); see also Daniel Hensel, Rep. Joe
Schwarz speaks on congressional fundraising, ISSUE ONE (July 27, 2016),
https://www.issueone.org/rep-joe-schwarz-speaks-congressional-fundraising/ (“Rep. Joe
Schwarz, a former Congressman from Michigan, recently [said in an interview]: ‘There’s a
lot of pressure on especially junior members of Congress . . . to raise money and they’re told
by . . . leadership you’re expected to spend a certain amount of time—and really a ridiculously
large amount of time—while in Washington at party headquarters, sometimes actually coldcalling people for money. It’s been done that way for years.’”); see also Brandon Lewis, Why
Candidates Hate Fundraising, CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS (Oct. 1 2013),
https://www.campaignsandelections.com/campaign-insider/why-candidates-hate-fundraising
(discussing why it’s demeaning and unfulfilling) (“Did little Johnny Candidate ever say, ‘I’d
like to be a telemarketer or a panhandler when I grow up?’ Of course not. However, that is
largely what a candidate is vocationally reduced to for months on end despite having
developed marketable, specialized skills in his or her career. Fundraising can be tedious,
boring and repetitious. It’s a creative, right-brainer’s nightmare.”).
90
Sarah D. Wire, This Is What It’s Like To Be A Cross-Country Flight Away From Your
Constituents — And Your Family, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/politi
cs/la-pol-ca-congress-california-fly-home-20180430-story.ht
ml (“‘If you’re on a flight on Monday morning, you lose a whole day. I sleep for a few hours,
I can start call time around noon, and I at least get maybe four hours of call time in before I
have to start my legislative day,’ [Rep. Nanette] Barragan said.”).
91
Arne Carlson & Gerald Sikorski, How ‘Dialing For Dollars’ Has Perverted Congress,
STAR TRIBUNE (May 4, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/how-dialing-for-dollars-hasperverted-congress/378184931/.
89
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as they leave the political arena. Besides dialing for dollars, lawmakers
seeking reelection also need to attend in-person fundraisers. As Thomas
E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein explain, “[p]arty leaders are prolific
fund-raisers, as are aspiring leaders . . . [b]ecoming a committee chair can
depend more on one’s fund-raising prowess than one’s legislative or
policy skills or knowledge.”92
According to Political Party Time, a nonprofit project of the
Sunlight Foundation that tracks federal political fundraisers, in the year
2016 there were 1,320 fundraisers, or more than three a day. Of those,
658 were for the Presidential election, and the remainder was for
Congressional elections.93
Can political scientists discern anything about the impact of inperson fundraisers in the available data? Yes indeed. And it does not
bode well. Dr. Eleanor Neff Powell studied the Political Party Time data
and compared it to votes in Congress. Dr. Powell’s conclusion is that
“Members’ fundraising for their congressional colleagues impacts both
their formal power within the chamber by affecting their rise to both party
and committee leadership positions and their informal power within the
chamber by increasing their ability to garner the votes of other
congressmen to pass their legislative priorities.”94
Dr. Powell also noted the magnitude of the fundraising goals that
political parties have set for their members of Congress. 95 Dr. Powell
reported that even pre-Citizens United:
[I]n the 2008 election cycle, rank and file Democratic
members were required to contribute $125,000 directly from
either their personal congressional campaign committee or
leadership PAC to the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee (DCCC) as membership dues. Speaker Pelosi, for
example, is expected to directly contribute $800,000 to the
DCCC and to 96raise an additional $25,000,000, for a total of
$25.8 million.
Thus, a large part of advancing into Congressional leadership is
dependent on fundraising.97 As Former Congressman Tim Roemer put it
92

MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 80.
CENT. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., POLITICAL PARTY TIME, http://politicalpartytime.org/
(last visited May 10, 2018).
94
Eleanor Neff Powell, Money and Internal Influence in Congress, SCHOLARS STRATEGY
NETWORK 3 (June 10, 2016), http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/pow
ell_money_andinternal_influence_in _.pdf.
95
MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 80 (“Parties are at the center, not the periphery,
of fundraising. They expect members of Congress to raise money for the team through their
personal campaign committees and leadership PACs, so that resources can be redistributed
from safe to competitive seats.”).
96
Powell, supra note 94, at 4.
97
See Josh Keefe, Next House Speaker: McCarthy vs. Scalise Is Battle of Wall Street vs.
93
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bluntly, “Members are now additionally ‘required’ to raise money for ‘the
party’ and contribute to pools of funds at the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee (“DCCC”) and the National Republican Campaign
Committee (“NRCC”). As a member rises in seniority to committee chair
or ranking member, their fundraising responsibilities multiply
significantly.”98 In other words, Congress is not a meritocracy where the
brightest lawmakers rise to the top. Rather, it is more akin to a boiler
room sales operation where the biggest seller receives a set of steak
knives and a promotion. As former Congressman Zach Wamp explained,
“[i]n Congress, . . . [i]f you can raise the most money, you advance.”99
Accordingly, the voting public should worry about the impact of
fundraising not just because of the “time suck” problem, but also because
it has an impact on who wields power within the House, which in turn
determines what legislation moves forward.100
V. NO ONE CAN MULTI-TASK INCLUDING ELECTED OFFICIALS
Another reason why fundraising by lawmakers is troubling stems
from cognitive science. Because fundraising is not allowed on the
grounds of the Capitol, including the buildings where members of the
House and Senate keep their offices, members of Congress have to walk
to nearby office buildings to engage in fundraising activity. 101 The
argument could be made that these lawmakers might bring their
legislative work with them, so as to do legislating and fundraising at the
same time. However, this type of multitasking is almost impossible
according to new research by psychologists. 102
Big Oil, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 12, 2018, 3:01 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/succeed-ryanmccarthy-relies-wall-street-scalise-oil-883733 (quoting political scientist Matthew Green)
(“‘The typical member of Congress spends about three to four hours a day dialing for dollars
while in D.C. That’s mostly for their own re-election,’ Green said. ‘Speakers, however, are
expected to raise money for themselves, for other Republican candidates and for their party.
Plus, they travel to fundraisers all over the country.’”).
98
Tim Roemer, Why Do Congressmen Spend Only Half Their Time Serving Us?,
NEWSWEEK (July 29, 2015, 11:38 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/why-do-congressmenspend-only-half-their-time-serving-us-357995.
99
Zach Wamp, Being In Congress Is Still All About Fundraising, And Voters Are Tired
Of It, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 14, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://www.washingtonexamine r.com
/being-in-congress-is-still-all-about-fundraising-and-voters-are-tired-of-it.
100
This phenomenon was noted decades earlier. See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM, SHOWDOWN
AT GUCCI GULCH, LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 180
(1988) (“Even politicians with secure seats sought contributions. The more they gave away,
the more powerful they could become in Congress.”).
101
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, H.R. 2356, § 302, 107th Cong. (2002).
102
Jon Hamilton, Think You’re Multitasking? Think Again, NPR (Oct. 2, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/ story/story.php?storyId=95256794 (quoting a professor of
neuroscience at MIT who said, “You’re not paying attention to one or two things
simultaneously, but switching between them very rapidly.”).

TORRES-SPELLISCY

294

2018

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

While humans tend to overestimate their cognitive abilities and
wrongly believe they possess the ability to multi-task, cognitive scientists
have shown this is not so.103 Most human beings actually cannot multitask at all.104 As Dr. Paul Atchley, Associate Professor of Cognitive
Psychology at the University of Kansas wrote in the Harvard Business
Review, “[b]ased on over a half-century of cognitive science and more
recent studies on multitasking, we know that multitaskers do less and
miss information.”105
Indeed, the idea of multitasking comes from computing, and like
computers, the human mind has its limits. Professors of Psychology
Daniela M. Kirchberg, Robert A. Roe, and Wendelien Van Eerde have
found:
[T]here are limits to what can be done within a certain period.
This is even so in the domain of computing from which the
concept ‘multitasking’ originated. . .If there are too many
simultaneous processes, programs may jam due to limited
storage and the computer may crash. Humans have limited
capacities as well and cannot process too many tasks
simultaneously (Wickens & McCarley, 2008). As the human
brain struggles to process multiple tasks in parallel, there 106
are
negative effects on work results as well as on well-being.
Simply put, there is a limit to humans’ attention and ability to
process information.107 An additional study on multitasking stated,
[a]ttention limits the ‘sea’ of sensory input, enabling
individuals to select out and focus on high-priority stimuli,
rather than becoming overloaded by the onslaught of the daily
103

Derek Thompson, If Multitasking is Impossible, Why Are Some People So Good at It?,
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 17, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/11/ifmultitasking-is-impossible-why-are-some-peo ple-so-good-at-it/248648/ (quoting Eyal
Ophir, researcher with the Stanford Multitasking study, who said that “[h]umans don’t really
multitask, we task-switch. We just switch very quickly between tasks, and it feels like we’re
multitasking.”).
104
Travis Bradberry, Multitasking Damages Your Brain and Career, New Studies
Suggest, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/travisbradberry/2014/10/08/m
ultitasking-damages-your-brain-and-career-new-studies-suggest/#2f64375e56ee (citing a
study at Stanford showing that “multitaskers” who think they are good at multitasking and do
it often are actually worse at multitasking than those who focus on one task at a time. The
multitaskers were slower at switching tasks because they could not filter out irrelevant
information or organize their thoughts).
105
Paul Atchley, You Can’t Multitask, So Stop Trying, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 21, 2010),
https://hbr. org/2010/12/you-cant-multi-task-so-stop-tr.
106
Daniela M. Kirchberg, Robert A. Roe, & Wendelien Van Eerde, Polychronicity and
Multitasking: A Diary Study at Work, 28 HUMAN PERFORMANCE 112, 131 (2015) (discussing
the practical implications).
107
Steve Lohr, A Warning on the Limits of Multitasking, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 25, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/25/business/worldbusiness/25iht-multi.1.5014965.html?m
cubz=2 (“‘But a core limitation is an inability to concentrate on two things at once,’ said René
Marois, a neuroscientist and director of the Human Information Processing Laboratory at
Vanderbilt University.”).
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stimulation. Because people possess a limited amount of
attentional resources, it is difficult108to attend to multiple
stimuli in the environment at once[.]
Even common actions that most people do simultaneously are, in
actuality, abject failures under closer scrutiny. 109 For example, driving
while talking on the phone is not something that most drivers can actually
do safely.
[Dr. David] Strayer . . . and his colleagues had demonstrated
that drivers using cell phones—even hands-free devices—
were at just as high a risk of accidents as intoxicated ones.
Reaction time slowed, attention decreased to the point where
they’d miss more than half the things they’d otherwise
see—
a billboard or a child by the road, it mattered not.”110
This inability to multitask has even been found among police
officers, who struggle with driving while also processing auditory
information. As researchers found, “[one] police officer missed
incoming radio messages because he preferred to prioritize the driving
task while the other police officer committed traffic violations as a result
of paying more attention to the radio messages.”111
And for those who argue that lawmakers can immediately start work
legislating once they return to Capitol Hill from call time off campus,
there is more bad news.112 Cognitive scientists also find that when
switching between disparate tasks, time is lost when the thinker returns
to the primary task.113 As Professor Atchley explained, “[i]t takes time
108

Tova Miller, Sufen Chen, Wei Wei Lee, & Elyse S. Sussman, Multitasking: Effects of
Processing Multiple Auditory Feature Patterns, 52 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 1140 (Sept. 2015)
(introducing the study and discussing the theories regarding multitasking).
109
Lohr, supra note 107 (“‘Multitasking is going to slow you down, increasing the
chances of mistakes,’ said David Mayer, a cognitive scientist and director of the Brain,
Cognition and Action Laboratory at the University of Michigan.”).
110
Maria Konnikova, Multitask Masters, THE NEW YORKER (May 7, 2014), http://www.
new yorker.com/ science/maria-konnikova/multitask-masters.
111
Reinier J. Jansen, Rene van Egmond, & Huib de Ridder, Task Prioritization in DualTasking: Instructions Versus Preferences, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 2 (July 8, 2016); but see Harold
Pashler, Sean H. K. Kang, & Renita Y. Ip, Does Multitasking Impair Studying? Depends on
Timing, 27 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 593, 597 (Mar. 18, 2013) (discussing the results
generally and “Multitasking produced a marked and substantial reduction in information
acquired from educational materials when the materials were presented in spoken form and
played without waiting for the learner. On the other hand, when the learner read the materials
at his or her own pace, there was no sizable or significant reduction in information acquired.”).
112
Christine Rosen, The Myth of Multitasking, THE NEW ATLANTIS: A J. OF TECH. & SOC.
(Spring 2008), (http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-myth-o-multitasking) (“One
study by researchers at the University of California at Irvine monitored interruptions among
office workers; they found that workers took an average of twenty-five minutes to recover
from interruptions such as phone calls or answering e-mail and return to their original task.”).
113
Lohr, supra note 107 (“In a recent study, a group of Microsoft workers took, on
average, 15 minutes to return to serious mental tasks, like writing reports or computer code,
after responding to incoming e-mail or instant messages. They strayed off to reply to other
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(an average of 15 minutes) to re-orient to a primary task after a
distraction . . . . Efficiency can drop by as much as 40%. Long-term
memory suffers and creativity—a skill associated with keeping in mind
multiple, less common, associations—is reduced.”114
Moreover, getting interrupted from a primary task during work can
intensify the problem of a time famine for the worker. The work of
Quintus R. Jett and Jennifer M. George has found that time pressure is
likely to lead to stress,115 noting “[a]dditional negative effects related to
time pressure may include heightened feelings of stress and anxiety, as
the person being interrupted recognizes that less time is available and that
he or she may be falling short in reaching task milestones.” 116 Other
researchers have similarly shown that “[n]otwithstanding the commonly
assumed positive effects associated with multitasking, our study shows
that multitasking goes together with lower self-rated performance and
with lower affective well-being, particularly when the preference for
multitasking is low.”117 If the average person cannot do two tasks at the
same time, expecting someone to legislate and talk on the phone at the
same time seems a tall—if not impossible—order.
VI. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN INCUMBENT CANDIDATES RUN OUT OF TIME:
POLICY AND FUNDRAISING GET OUTSOURCED

Where do elected officials turn to help with soliciting campaign
money once they run out of time? It is not the great body of the people
of the United States that James Madison referred to in Federalist No.

messages or browse news, sports or entertainment Web sites.”).
114
Atchley, supra note 105.
115
Kirchberg, supra note 106, at 133 (concluding the results: “The high demands on . . .
cognitive resources needed to multitask on a daily basis may lead to burnout symptoms,
reduced job satisfaction, and lowered commitment, and this may result in worsened
performance.”).
116
Quintus R. Jett & Jennifer M. George, Work Interrupted: A Closer Look at The Role
of Interruptions in Organizational Life, 28 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 494, 496 (2003) (discussing
interruptions).
117
Kirchberg, supra note 106, at 129-30; see also Brandon Ralph, David Thomson, James
Cheyne, & Daniel Smilek, Media Multitasking and Failures of Attention in Everyday Life, 78
PSYCHOL. RES. 661, 667 (Sept., 2014) (“media multitasking might atrophy endogenous
attentional control, which ultimately leads to a subjective increase in attention related errors
in everyday life.”).

TORRES-SPELLISCY

2018]

2018

TIME SUCK

297

57.118 Often the answer is lobbyists. 119 Given the size of the
administrative state, there is a lot to lobby about.120 As Thomas E. Mann
and Norman J. Ornstein describe:
[i]n a city [D.C.] where much of the business is about
divvying up over $3 trillion in federal spending and carving
out tax breaks from over $2 trillion in revenues, the money
spent on influencing those decisions has mushroomed, and
the money that lobbyists and121their associates make has
become almost mind-boggling.
Lobbyists are both potential sources of campaign checks as well as
potential bundlers of donations from others, including their lobbying
clients. Furthermore, many lobbyists organize in-person fundraisers on
behalf of Members of Congress.122
Regarding the campaign finance system, Leon Panetta (who would
later serve as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and
Secretary of Defense under President Obama) stated:
[l]egalized bribery has become part of the culture of how this
place [D.C.] operates. Today’s members of the House and
Senate rarely legislate; they basically follow the money . . . .
They’re spending more and more time dialing for dollars . . . .
The only place they have to turn is to the lobbyists. Members
have a whole list of names in their pockets at all times, and
they just keep
dialing. It has become an addiction that they
can’t break.123
118

Laurence H. Tribe, Dividing Citizens United: The Case v. The Controversy, 30(2)
CONST. COMMENT. 463, 479 (Summer 2015) (quoting James Madison’s Federalist 57. “Who
are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the
learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the
humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the
people of the United States.”).
119
LESSIG, supra note 26, at 113 (“As one lobbyist put it expressly, ‘I spend a huge among
of my time fundraising . . . A huge amount.’ That behavior has been confirmed to me by
countless others, not so eager to be on the record.”).
120
WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 107 (1993) (“The explosion of modern regulation, more than anything else, is
what brought the money to Washington and transformed the capital from a sleepy small town
to a glamorous power center. During the 1930s, Roosevelt’s New Deal created 42 major
regulatory agencies and programs. Most of these involved economic regulation of specific
sectors (airlines, broadcasting, oil and agricultural production and others), arrangements
usually created in cooperation with the affected industries. During the 1960s, 53 regulatory
programs were enacted, as consumer issues and environmental protection gained political
momentum. From 1970 to 1980, 130 major regulatory laws were enacted. That is what
brought the Fortune 500 to Washington, along with the tens of thousands of lawyers.”).
121
MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 68.
122
ROBERT G. KAISER, SO DAMN MUCH MONEY THE TRIUMPH OF LOBBYING AND THE
CORROSION OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 292 (2009) (“Employees of the [Cassidy] firm were
never instructed to make specific contributions but they knew that they were expected to pony
up. ‘It was clearly understood that we were to give about half our annual bonus to politicians,’
Smith recalled.”).
123
Id. at 19 (quoting Leon Panetta).
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Or as Jeffrey H. Birnbaum explained colorfully in his book on
lobbying: “Washington was a virtual money machine, and lobbyists
provided much of the fuel. It was if there were a nightly sale, and the
members of Congress were the merchandise.”124
Fundraising has become an exhausting endeavor for both lawmakers
and lobbyists. Lee Drutman reported a lobbyist complaining that, “on
any given day I’ll get 25 faxed invitations to Washington-based
fundraisers.”125 John B. Judis noted in his book that “Thomas Boggs, one
of Washington’s most successful lobbyists, became know for hosting
events for as many as 125 politicians during each election season.”126
Robert G. Kaiser reported in his book on money in politics,
[t]he people who worked for [the lobbyist firm] Cassidy
understood that giving [political donations] was part of their
job . . . Geoff Gonella, who worked at the firm from 1992 to
2002, said, ‘Cassidy realized that the way to get things
done . . . was
to be a huge financial resource for members of
Congress.’127
The fundraising expectations for lobbyists has only increased thanks
to a 2014 Supreme Court case called McCutcheon which invalidated the
long-standing two-year aggregate limit on individual donations in the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA 1971”) as amended by
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”).128 A lobbyist
told the press after McCutcheon, “I’m horrified, planning to de-list my
phone number and destroy my email address . . . . What I was really
hoping for is a ban on lobbyists making contributions entirely.”129
Many lobbyists are also lawyers. And the American Bar
124

BIRNBAUM, supra note 100, at 179.
LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUS. OF AM. IS LOBBYING, HOW CORP. BECAME POLITICIZED AND
POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE 95 (2015); see also JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM, SHOWDOWN
AT GUCCI GULCH, LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM xii
(1988) (Introduction by Albert Hunt) (“Most politicians spend enormous time raising these
[campaign] funds; rarely does a night go by in Washington without a political fundraiser
populated chiefly by special interests.”).
126
JOHN B. JUDIS, THE PARADOX OF AM. DEMOCRACY: ELITES, SPECIAL INTERESTS, AND
THE BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST 133-134 (2000).
127
KAISER, supra note 122, at 292; see also SCHRAM, supra note 44, at 98 (quoting Rep.
Tim Penny (D-Minnesota)) (“Look at Cassidy and Associates if you want a classic example
of how it works in small ways. This is a lobbying firm that also goes out of its way to also
help raise money, hold fund-raisers for individuals [in Congress]. Not so much their own
money, but they help corral other contributions.”).
128
Zephyr Teachout, The Supreme Court’s McCutcheon V. FEC Ruling Leaves A
Campaign Finance Void, WASH. POST. (Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin
ions/the-supreme-courts-mccutcheon-v-fec-ruling-leaves-a-campaign-finance-void/2014/04/
03/b20a7d38-ba93-11e3-9a05-c739f29ccb08story.html?utm_term=. fbe0223c512b.
129
Anna Palmer & Tarini Parti, Big Donors Fear Shakedown, POLITICO (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/supreme-court-campaign-finance-donations-mc-cut
cheon-105320#ixzz3s eZZ9o8X.
125
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Association (“ABA”) has taken notice of how these lobbyist lawyers have
been interacting in our political system. The ABA’s Task Force on
Federal Lobbying Laws reported with some dismay:
[T]he multiplier effect of a lobbyists’ participation in
fundraising for a member’s campaign (or the member’s
leadership PAC) can be quite substantial, and the Task Force
believes that this activity should be substantially
curtailed . . . . [A] self-reinforcing cycle of mutual financial
dependency has become a 130
deeply troubling source of
corruption in our government.
But the reason lobbyists are frequently donors to Members is
summed up by an admission of current OMB Director Mick Mulvaney,
who was a Member of Congress for six years. As reported in the press
Mr. Mulvaney stated:
We had a hierarchy in my office, in Congress. If you were a
lobbyist who never gave us money, I didn’t talk to you,”
Mulvaney said, according to a transcript of his speech to the
American Bankers Association provided by the CFPB. “If
you were a lobbyist who gave us money, I might talk to you.
If you came from back home and sat in my lobby, I talk to
you without exception, 131
regardless of the financial
contributions,” he continued.
In other words, as a Congressman, Mr. Mulvaney and his staff
barred access for lobbyists who were not political donors to his
campaigns.132
If they are not turning to lobbyists who have business pending before
the government, federal candidates will raise political funds from wealthy
donors.133 For instance, former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton was
130
LESSIG, supra note 26, at 119 (quoting ABA report from the Task Force on Federal
Lobbying Laws).
131
Kate Ackley, Mulvaney Backlash May Drive Political Money Changes, ROLL CALL
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/mulvaney-backlash-political-money;
see also Meredith McGehee, Time for Washington to end the tradition of ‘pay to play’ politics,
THE HILL (Apr. 27, 2018, 12:00 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/finance/385193-time-forwashington-to-end-the-tradition-of-pay-to-play-politics.
132
Caitlin Byrd, Former South Carolina GOP congressman Mick Mulvaney admits his
access was tied to donors, CHARLESTON POST & COURIER (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.postan
dcourier.com/politics/former-south-carolina-gop-congressman-mick-mulvaney-admits-his-a
ccess/article_0e335b3e-4893-11e8-87f2-a3212f3144d1.html (“‘It sounds like Mick is
swimming in the swamp more than draining the swamp, and it’s a problem,’ said Bob Inglis,
another former South Carolina congressman.”).
133
Tribe, supra note 118, at 481 (“[We are] in the era of what many have called a ‘great
divergence[]’ . . . over the past four decades America has witnessed ever-growing (and too
often racially skewed) gaps between rich and poor: in income, wealth, health, educational
outcomes, and even in family stability. As the lived experiences of the wealthy and the poor
diverge, it becomes increasingly significant that the political system is more responsive—and
widely understood to be more responsive—to the preferences of one group than to those of
the other.”); see also Sarah C. Haan, The CEO and the Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Deregulation, 109 NORTHWESTERN U. LAW R. 269, 272 (2015) (“Ordinary Americans believe
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an avid fundraiser in her second attempt to run for president. Prior to the
2016 presidential election, in August, “Mrs. Clinton raked in roughly $50
million at 22 fund-raising events, averaging around $150,000 an hour,
according to a New York Times tally . . . she fielded hundreds of questions
from the ultrarich in places like the Hamptons, Martha’s Vineyard,
Beverly Hills and Silicon Valley.”134 In contrast to President Obama,
who had a day job at the time he was campaigning—being President—
Secretary Clinton did not have a government job while campaigning, and
thus her dedication to fundraising did not take away from governing
responsibilities. Secretary Clinton was seemingly, day after day,
surrounded by some of the wealthiest Americans at fundraisers and
events. Members of Congress frequently take a similar approach. As
Nick Penniman and Wendell Potter described, “[t]he hard money chase
marinates our elected representatives in the mind-sets of the wealthy and
special interests—and takes them away from doing the job we voters pay
them to do.”135
What do the biggest donors get in return for the campaign
contributions and expenditures? This is a matter of great debate and
dispute.136 Martin Gilens argues, based on his empirical studies, “[t]he
American government does respond to the public’s preferences, but that
responsiveness is strongly tilted toward the most affluent citizens.
Indeed, under most circumstances, the preferences of the vast majority of
Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which policies the
they have lost the ability to command the attention of candidates and elected officials because
they cannot compete with the significant election-related spending of the ‘donor class.’ This
is an elite group of wealthy individuals—according to the Sunlight Foundation, 31,385
people—who in 2012 donated more than one-quarter of the money spent on federal
elections.”).
134
Amy Chozick & Jonathan Martin, Where Has Hillary Clinton Been? Ask the Ultrarich,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/us/politics/hillary-clintonfundraising.html?_r=0.
135
Nick Penniman & Wendell Potter, Citizens United is only 15% of the political cash
problem, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-pennimanpotter-political-campaign-finance-reform-20160308-story.html.
136
Michelle C. Gabriel, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission: The Problem of
Eradicating Campaign Finance Corruption, 12 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 1, 13 (2008) (New
York City Bar Association studied contributions and found that large contributions most often
resulted in specific wording in a bill, making a certain bill a priority, or allowing the donor an
opportunity to make his case rather than outright buying the vote); but see Bradley A.
Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform,
105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1068 (1996) (“A substantial majority of those who have studied voting
patterns on a systematic basis agree that campaign contributions affect very few votes in the
legislature.”); Lynda W. Powell, The Influence of Campaign Contributions on the Legislative
Process, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 75, 100 (2014) (claiming that donor influence on
actual roll-call votes is negligible (or at least hard to pin down), but there is certainly influence
on softer functions upstream in the legislative process like a bill having a higher priority in
committee or the bill gets killed quietly.).
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government does or doesn’t adopt.”137 Perhaps this is why the American
public holds Congress in such low esteem.138
The biggest donors are unquestionably shaping the legislative
agenda, especially if they have been reliable sources of funding over the
decades.139 Big donors, those who can and do give hundreds of thousands
of dollars far outstrip the smaller donors at the $1,000 or less mark.140
For instance, in “Dark Money,” author Jane Mayer describes how the
Koch Brothers, long-term mega-donors, has influenced and shaped
Congressional agendas. As Mayer puts it, “the Kochs had fulfilled
Charles’s 1981 ambition not just to support elected politicians, whom he
regarded as mere ‘actors playing out a script,’ but to ‘supply the themes
and words for the scripts.’”141 Mayer went on, “[b]y 2015, their [the
Koch Brothers’] antigovernment lead was followed by much of Congress.
Addressing global warming was out of the question. Although economic
inequality had reached record levels, raising taxes on the runaway rich
and closing special loopholes that advantages only them were also
nonstarters.”142 Professor Jacob Hacker reported similar successes by the
Kochs:
Indeed, for most organized interests, spending on elections is
just the training season; the real games begin once elected
officials start governing. David Koch put it bluntly: ‘Our
main interest is not participating in campaigns . . . . Our main
interest is in policy.’ This from a man who, combined with
his brother and the political network he leads, spent more in
the 2012 election cycle than the entire campaign of John
137

Adam Lioz & Karen Shanton, Moving from Big Money Dominance in the 2014
Midterms to a Small Donor Democracy, 9 (2015) (quoting Martin Gilens), http://www.uspirg
.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/TheMoneyChase-Report_0.pdf.
138
Domenico Montanaro, Here’s Just How Little Confidence Americans Have In
Political Institutions, NPR (Jan. 17, 2018, 5:00 AM ET) https://www.npr.org/2018/01/17
/578422668/heres-just-how-little-confidence-americans-hav
e-in-political-institutions (“The American public has the least confidence in Congress, the
body tasked with making laws that can affect every person in the country. Just 8 percent of
people have a great deal of confidence in the institution.”).
139
Thomas Stratmann, The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions
Everything?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 85, 110 (1998) (“PACs use these funds to influence campaigns
and legislative events.”).
140
BLAIR BOWIE & ADAM LIOZ, PIRG AND DEMOS, DISTORTED DEMOCRACY: POSTELECTION SPENDING ANALYSIS 1 (2012), http://uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/post%20elec
tion%20megaphones%20FINAL.pdf (“[J]ust 61 large donors to Super PACs giving an
average of $4.7 million each matched the $285.2 million in grassroots contributions from
more than 1,425,500 small donors to the major party presidential candidates.”).
141
MAYER, supra note 66, at 374.
142
MAYER, supra note 66, at 374; see also Jacob S. Hacker & Nathan Loewenthiel, How
Big Money Corrupts the Economy, 27 DEMOCRACY J. 32, 33-34 (2013), http://democracy
journal.org/magazine/27/how-big-money-corrupts-the-economy/ (“Six in ten of the richest
0.1 percent of Americans are corporate or financial executives. The Koch brothers, for
example, are both huge individual donors and leaders of an industry juggernaut.”).
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McCain did in 2008.143
And the Koch Brothers have continued pushing policy in 2017. 144
What the Koch Brothers did on an enormous scale, other donors did
on a smaller scale. At least one Senator admitted that political donors
had the ability to influence the way Senators conducted their legislative
work. Senator Wyche Folwer stated:
I was on the Ways and Means Committee for six years. And
every single interest that comes to you has got a special
private interest where they are seeking to get subsidized,
through the tax code . . . I am sure that on many occasions—
I’m not proud of it—I made the choice that I needed this big
corporate client and therefore I voted for, or sponsored, its
provision, even though I did not think 145
it was in the was best
interest of the country or the economy.
Congressman Vin Weber admitted to similar activity when he was
in Congress. Congressman Weber stated: “all of us, me included, are
guilty of this: [i]f the company or interest group is (a) supportive of you
and (b) vitally concerned about an issue that (c) nobody else in your
district knows about or ever will know about, then the political calculus
is very simple.”146 Congressman Levine found the impact of money in
politics to be even broader stating, “[o]n the tax side, the appropriations
side, the subsidy side and the expenditure side, decisions are clearly
weighted and influenced . . . by who had contributed to the
candidates.”147 Or as Senator John McCain once summed up, “it would
be hard to find much legislation enacted by any Congress that did not
contain one or more obscure provision that served no legitimate national
or even local interest, but which was intended only as a reward for a
generous campaign supporter.”148 As recently as 2016, Congressman
Walter Jones indicated, “[t]his place has not done anything since
McCain-Feingold in the area of campaign finance reform. We’ve done
nothing. Policy is controlled by special interests. Policy should be
143

Hacker & Loewenthiel, supra note 142, at 35.
Steve Peoples, Donor to GOP: No Cash Until Action on Health Care, Taxes, U.S.
NEWS (June 26, 2017, 11:32 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-0626/koch-urgency-conservative-network-fears-closing -window (“Indeed, there was a sense of
frustration and urgency inside the private receptions and closed-door briefings at the Koch
brothers’ donor retreat this weekend in Colorado Springs, where the billionaire conservatives
and their chief lieutenants warned of a rapidly shrinking window to push their agenda through
Congress and get legislation to President Donald Trump to sign into law.”).
145
SCHRAM, supra note 44, at 3 (quoting Sen. Wyche Folwer (D-Georgia)).
146
SCHRAM, supra note 44, at 4 (quoting Rep. Vin Weber (R-Minnesota)).
147
SCHRAM, supra note 44, at 89 (quoting Rep. Mel Levine (D-California)).
148
Monica Youn, The Fair Elections Now Act: A Comprehensive Response to Citizens
United, BRENNAN CENT. FOR JUST. 10 (2011), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/fairelections-now-act-comprehensive-response-citizens-united (quoting Senator John McCain
(R-Arizona)).
144
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controlled by the people.”149
Of course, every poor policy decision cannot be traced definitively
to the role of money in politics. But it does seem to lie at the heart of
many disastrous policies from the S&L bailout to the more recent TARP
bailout.150 Ms. Alyssa Katz notes that one explanation for the housing
policies that led to the 2008 financial collapse of the U.S. economy is
traceable to political spending by real estate interests in Congressional
races. According to Ms. Katz:
[r]eal estate interests constitute the most generous lobby in
Washington. Four out of the ten biggest political action
committees contributing to Congress build, sell, or fund
homes. The finance and real estate industries together spent
nearly $2 billion lobbying Congress in the decade that began
in 1998 (with almost $300 million of that in 2007 alone).
Since 1990 they’ve given nearly as much in congressional
campaign contributions. The real estate industry’s lobbyists
have helped create a climate in which the very possibility of
government policies that might set reasonable
limits on
lending have been rendered unthinkable.151
Thus, fundraising can impact what bills move in Congress. 152
Donors often want access to the candidate after the election.153 As
Congressman Romano Mazzoli said, “[p]eople who contribute get the ear
of the member and the ear of the staff. They have the access—and access
is it. Access is power. Access is clout. That’s how this thing works.”154
The interaction between fundraiser and funder can become quite
149
Michael Beckel, Meet the GOP Congressman Who Wants to Overturn ‘Citizens
United’: Walter Jones Says Fundraising Has ‘Gotten Out of Hand’ in Washington, CENT. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 21, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2016/01/21/19154
/meet-gop-congressman-who-wants-overturn-citizens-united.
150
SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 25, at 8 (referring to the Keating Five Scandal)
(“evidence abounds that oversight of the nation’s financial system was corrupted by legal
campaign contributions.”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST
DEMOCRACY 169-70 (2010) (“The government had created that environment [of lax financial
regulation], albeit under pressure from the finance industry. Moneyed interest groups,
dispensing the quasi-bribes known as campaign donations, exert a powerful influence on
American government.”).
151
ALYSSA KATZ, OUR LOT HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN US 225 (2009); see also
BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 44 (2011) (“Fannie Mae also funneled money to politicians. In addition to
campaign contributions, Fannie set up a foundation that made contributions to politically
useful causes . . . . It made heavy donations to, among others, the nonprofit arms of the
Congressional Black Caucus and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus.”).
152
SCHRAM, supra note 44, at 21 (quoting Rep. Don Edwards (D-California) (“It is a
concern to the institution because you are financed largely not by yourself, not by friends, but
by people with an interest in legislation.”).
153
Weiss, supra note 24 (responding to the question, “[a]s fundraisers, what do you see
as your major challenges approaching the 2012 campaign cycle? . . . Kimberly Scott [said] . . .
donors are motivated by three basic things: the candidate, the issue, or the access.”).
154
SCHRAM, supra note 44, at 4 (quoting Rep. Romano Mazzoli).

TORRES-SPELLISCY

304

2018

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

transactional. Responding to the question, “[a]re you finding that it is
more difficult to reach out to larger donors? Are they more inundated
with fundraising solicitations?” Steve Linder a partner at the Sterling
Corporation, a Michigan based Republican consulting firm said,
[o]ne point that I don’t want to get lost is we’re all talking
about raising money at, sort of, point of sale. One factor that
plays into whether or not we’re going to continue to raise
large dollars from known donors is the care and feeding that
they get. And one thing that we are finding is a lot of donors,
especially those that have weathered a very bad economy for
several years and feel a bit beleaguered, are responding to
those that communicated with them, that took care of them,
that kept them informed and made them feel that they
weren’t
just a check, but that they were a valued customer.155
In late 2017, Congress happened to be in the middle of a once in a
generation attempt to overhaul the American tax code.156 This was on the
heels of a failure by Congress to repeal the Affordable Care Act, which
would have included massive tax cuts for the wealthy. 157 The failure to
repeal the Affordable Care Act was followed by a drop in donations to
Senate Republicans.158
One motivator of this effort to revise the tax code was the desire by
wealthy political donors for personal tax cut for themselves, their families
and their businesses.159 And both donors and certain lawmakers were
surprisingly confessional about the fact that big donors were demanding
these tax cuts.160 For example on the donor side, the press reported quotes
155

Weiss, supra note 24.
Thomas Kaplan & Alan Rappeport, House Passes Tax Bill, as Does Senate Panel,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/us/politics/house-taxoverhaul-bill.html.
157
Carl Hulse, Behind New Obamacare Repeal Vote: ‘Furious’ G.O.P. Donors, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/us/politics/republican-donorsobamacare-repeal.html (“Campaign fund-raising was drying up, [Senator Cory Gardner] said,
because of widespread disappointment among donors over the inability of the Republican
Senate to repeal the Affordable Care Act or do much of anything else.”).
158
Geoff West, Koch Network’s Failing Investment In ACA Repeal, HUFF. POST (Oct. 10,
2017, 9:40 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/koch-networks-failing-investmentin-acarepeal_us_59dcccb3e4b0a1bb90b8 30f6 (“Contributions reported by the RNSC have
plummeted since March, specifically after the Senate’s failed repeal vote in July, according
to FEC filings.”).
159
Dere Thompson, Why the GOP’s Dream of Tax Reform Is (Probably) Doomed, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/11/gop-taxcut/545450/ (“By eliminating the estate tax, it would benefit heirs of large estates, even if they
don’t work a day in their life.”).
160
Russ Choma, Republicans Say They’ve Got to Act on Tax Reform—or Donors Might
Get Mad, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 10, 2017, 11:14 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2
017/11/republicans-say-theyve-got-to-act-on-tax-reform-or-donors-might-get-mad/
(“Everyone knows politicians pay excessive attention to the demands of their campaign
donors. But if you’re a politician, you’re not supposed to actually say that publicly.”); Paul
156
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like these:
Doug Deason, a well-known conservative donor from
Texas, announced that ‘the Dallas piggy bank’ for
Republican politicians was closed until GOP lawmakers
started delivering. He had already refused two congressional
Republicans who had asked him to hold fundraisers. ‘Get
Obamacare repealed and replaced, get tax reform passed,’
Deason said. ‘You control the Senate. You control the House.
You have the presidency. There’s no reason you can’t get
this 161
done. Get it done and we’ll open it [fundraising] back
up.’
Earlier in the year, the Koch network made its position on tax reform
clear: “‘If they don’t make good on these promises [for tax reform] . . .
there are going to be consequences, and quite frankly there should be,’
said Sean Lansing, chief operating officer for the Koch network’s
political arm, Americans For Prosperity.”162 Fundraisers for Republican
Super PACs were also clear: “‘[Donors] would be mortified if we didn’t
live up to what we’ve committed to on tax reform,’ Steven Law, the head
of Senate Conservatives Fund, a super PAC affiliated with Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), told the New York Post.”163
And from Members of Congress the public heard surprisingly
candid quotes like this: “‘Donors are furious,’ one person knowledgeable
about the private meeting quoted [Senator] Gardner as saying. ‘We
haven’t kept our promise.’”164 Additionally “Senator Lindsey Graham
(R-S.C.) said GOP donors will quit giving to Republicans if Congress
does not pass tax reform.”165 Meanwhile in the House, Congressman
Blumenthal, Republicans Admit That CEOs And Donors Really Need The Tax Cut Bill To
Pass—Or Else, HUFF. POST (Nov. 9, 2017, 1:57 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry
/gary-cohn-tax-cut-ceos-donors_us_5a049571e4b 0f76b05c4249e (“It isn’t often that
politicians admit that their failure to pass legislation will impact their ability to collect money
for their campaigns. They usually try to avoid an appearance that campaign contributions are
linked to specific legislation.”); Geoff West, Koch Network’s Failing Investment In ACA
Repeal, HUFF. POST (Oct. 10, 2017, 9:40 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/kochnetworks-failing-investment-in-acarepeal_us_59 dcccb3e4b 0a1bb90b830f6 (“Repealing
health care isn’t the only priority of conservative dark money, however, and Republicans have
turned quickly to a savoir—revising the tax code—with the eyes of deep-pocketed donors
waiting and watching.”).
161
Russ Choma, Republicans Say They’ve Got to Act on Tax Reform—or Donors Might
Get Mad, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 10, 2017, 11:14 AM), http://www.motherjones.com /politics
/2017/11/republicans-say-theyve-got-to-act-on-tax-reform-or-donors-might-get-mad/.
162
Peoples, supra note 144.
163
Blumenthal, supra note 160.
164
Carl Hulse, Behind New Obamacare Repeal Vote: ‘Furious’ G.O.P. Donors, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/us/politics/republican-donorsobamacare-repeal.html.
165
Rebecca Savransky, Graham: ‘Financial Contributions Will Stop’ If GOP Doesn’t
Pass Tax Reform, THE HILL (Nov. 9, 2017, 11:32 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/3596
06-graham-financial-contributions-will-stop-if-gop-doesnt-pass-tax-reform.
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Chris Collins when asked by a reporter if donors are happy with the taxreform proposal said this: “My donors are basically saying, “Get it done
or don’t ever call me again.”166
This is all a bit galling since the tax cuts for the rich in the House
version of the bill are paid for by raising the taxes on individuals who
earn between $10,000-$75,000 a year; and by lowering or eliminating tax
deductions used by the middle class, such as, mortgage interest
deduction, local tax deductions, medical expense deductions and school
supplies deductions for teachers. Even White House advisers admitted
that the individuals who would be most pleased by the tax bill are CEOs
and the Business Roundtable.167 But even if voters take out their anger
on politicians who raise their taxes, politicians must have calculated that
it was more important to first keep political donors happy and then try to
win over voters with campaign money.
A. Reforms in Light of the Problem of Dwindling Candidate Time
Polling in recent years reveals that there is an appetite for campaign
finance reform among the American public.168 For instance, in a
Washington Post poll sixty-five percent pointed to money in politics as
“causing dysfunction in the U.S. political system.” 169 And in 2018 Pew
found seventy-seven percent of Americans in favor of campaign finance
reform.170 There are a few solutions that could help solve the “time suck”
166

Cristina Marcos, GOP Lawmaker: Donors are pushing me to get tax reform done, THE
HILL (Nov. 10, 2017, 11:23 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/359110-gop-lawmaker
-donors-are-pushing-me-to-get-tax-reform-done; see also Peoples, supra note 144 (“It’s the
same for an overhaul of the tax code, [Congressman] Brat said: ‘We don’t get taxes through,
we’re all going home. Pack the bags.”).
167
Blumenthal, supra note 160 (“‘The most excited group out there are big CEOs, about
our tax plan,’ Gary Cohn, the leading White House economic adviser and former chief
operating officer at Goldman Sachs, said in an interview with CNBC on Thursday.”); Sylvan
Lane, Cohn: CEOs Are The ‘Most Excited Group’ About GOP Tax Plan, THE HILL (Nov. 9,
2017, 9:51 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/359573-cohn-ceos-are-the-most-excitedabout-gop-tax-plan (“‘So, our biggest supporters are really the Business Roundtable,’ said
Cohn, referring to the powerful group of major U.S. executives that’s thrown millions of
dollars behind ads supporting the GOP tax bill.”).
168
Majority of Americans Support Campaign Finance Reform Ipsos Poll on behalf of the
Center for Public Integrity, IPSOS (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/newspolls/center-for-public-integrity-2017-08-31.
169
John Wagner & Scott Clement, ‘It’s Just Messed Up’: Most Think Political Divisions
As Bad As Vietnam Era, New Poll Shows, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.w
ashingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/national/democracy-poll/?utmterm=.e10b0 f2ce43f.
170
The Public, the Political System and American Democracy, PEW RESEARCH CENT. 73
(Apr. 26, 2018), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/04/26140617
/4-26-2018-Democracy-release.pdf (“A wide majority of Americans continue to believe that
there should be limits on the amount of money political candidates can spend on campaigns:
Roughly three-quarters (77%) feel that such limits are appropriate. A somewhat smaller
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problem, such as, providing federal candidates with free broadcast time,
public financing, and limits on campaign expenditures. 171 For example,
reforms could address one of the primary drivers of campaign costs—the
expensive nature of thirty-second broadcast advertisements.172 If this is
the real issue, then providing some free advertisements for federal
candidates on broadcast TV and radio could help alleviate the pressure
associated with raising funds to pay for such advertisements.173
Another way to look at the problem is that American elections are
privately financed, thus privileging those who are successful at shaking
the money tree. If this is the ultimate problem, then public financing for
elections is the solution.174 Public financing has been tried in many
different ways across the country from full public financing for
candidates in Connecticut,175 to partial public financing in New York

majority (65%) think that new campaign finance laws could be effective in limiting the
amount of money in political campaigns.”).
171
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
663, 669 (1997) (describing reform proposal which uses public funds/benefits to incentivize
candidates to voluntarily limit their spending); Christopher M. Straw, The Role of Electoral
Accountability in the Madisonian Machine, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 360 (20072008) (“One solution . . . is increasing the level of campaign subsidies provided by the
government.”).
172
Arthur N. Eisenberg, Buckley, Rupert Murdoch, and the Pursuit of Equality in the
Conduct of Elections, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 451, 463 (1996) (“[S]ome campaign reforms
are, nonetheless, possible. Such reform efforts rather than focusing on spending limits should
look to a variety of other mechanisms including public financing, free television time, and
franking privileges for all candidates. The best way to reduce the undesirable influence of
money is to reduce the financial dependency of candidates.”); see also Jeffrey A. Levinson,
Note, An Informed Electorate: Requiring Broadcasters to Provide Free Airtime to Candidates
for Public Office, 72 B.U. L. REV. 143, 143 (1992) (“Television and radio reach millions of
Americans, and requiring radio and television broadcasters to provide free airtime to
candidates for public office would best promote Jefferson’s idea of ensuring that Americans
are informed and, in his view, free. Free airtime would enhance citizen awareness of public
issues, encourage participation in our democratic system of governance, and thereby rebuild
Americans’ sense of community and shared future.”).
173
Jørgen Albæk Jensen, Freedom of Speech and the Legal Regulation of Political
Campaigns in the United States, 2 EUR. PUB. L. 293, 321-22 (1996) (“A possibility that seems
absolutely obvious to a European, but that has never been used in the United States, is to grant
free airtime (or airtime at reduced costs) to the candidates either to be used as the candidates
want to use it, or combined with certain demands related to the use of free airtime.”).
174
Richard Briffault, The Future of Public Funding, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 521, 538
(2012-2013) (“In a flat grant system, the larger the initial public grant, the less the need for
and the less the dependence on private donations.”); see also Joel M. Gora, Free Speech, Fair
Elections, and Campaign Finance Laws: Can They Co-exist?, 56 HOW. L.J. 763, 798 (2013)
(“The public funding should be generous and equally available to all qualified candidates, not
just to those representing the two major parties.”).
175
J. Mijin Cha & Miles Rapoport, Fresh Start: The Impact of Public Campaign
Financing in Connecticut, DEMOS (Apr. 2013), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files
/publications/FreshStart_PublicFinancingCT_0.pdf.
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City,176 to vouchers in Seattle.177 And, of course, for decades there was
presidential public financing that combined partial public financing in the
primary with full public financing in the general election.178 But the
presidential public financing system atrophied as the money it offered
failed to keep pace with the cost of privately funded presidential runs.
Congress has never had a public financing system, though there have
been a number of legislative proposals to provide public financing to
Congressional candidates.179 A properly designed public financing
system would give federal candidates an alternative to endless call time.
Alternatively, if the problem is that candidates waste their precious
time that they should be legislating, one solution suggested by Professor
Jerry H. Goldfeder is candidates could be banned from making personal
solicitations of campaign funds. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this
type of personal solicitation ban for judicial candidates in Williams-Yulee
v. Florida Bar in 2015.180 And as Professor Goldfeder notes this idea is
not so outlandish as for one hundred years in New York, “[p]olice who
run for office are also barred from soliciting or receiving
contributions . . . .”181 This approach would at least get elected officials
out of the fundraising cubical and back to the work of legislating.
176
Spencer Overton, Matching Political Contributions, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1694, 1696
(2012) (“Multiple matching funds address the core challenge to financial political
participation-a lack of income.”); see id. at 1714 (“Multiple matching programs increase
participation, as demonstrated by the New York City program that matches the first $175 of
a political contribution at a six-to-one ratio.”); see also Michael Waldman, Political
Accountability, Campaign Finance, and Regulatory Reform, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 83, 88
(2013) (advocating for increasing small donor contributions by having a public match on those
funds because it changes the mix of those who contribute to political campaigns).
177
Lawrence Norden & Douglas Keith, Small Donor Tax Credits: A New Model,
BRENNAN CENT. FOR JUST. 2 (2017) (“In the last two years, voters in Seattle approved a
program which allows residents to make small political donations using tax dollars, and voters
in Tallahassee passed a program that refunds small donations.”). And in late breaking news
the District of Columbia adopted public financing for city candidates. See Peter Jamison, D.C.
Mayor, Reversing Course, Signs Law Creating Publicly Financed Campaigns, WASH. POST
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-mayor-reversingcourse-signs-law-creating-publicly-financed-campaigns/2018/03/13/699b6e90-26f5-11e8-b
79d-f3d931db7f68_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.aa5f06e.
178
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, How Much Is an Ambassadorship? And the Tale of How
Watergate Led to a Strong Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and a Weak Federal Election
Campaign Act, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 71, 71 (2012).
179
John P. Sarbanes & Raymond O’Mara III, Power & Opportunity: Campaign Finance
Reform for the 21st Century, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 27 (2016) (advocating for “Government
By the People Act” which encourages small donors through a 50% tax credit on donations up
to $100).
180
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015).
181
Jerry H. Goldfeder, Ban Candidates From Soliciting Campaign Dough, N.Y.L.J.
(Nov. 14, 2017, 2:45 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/sites/newyorklawjourn
al/2017/11/14/ban-candidates-from-soliciting-campaign-dough/?slreturn=20180329211217.
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Congressman Jolly introduced such a bill that would have barred direct
solicitations by Members called the “Stop Act,” but the legislation did
not pass.182
Finally, if the time suck problem is really an arms race problem—
wherein Candidate A will not stop fundraising out of fear that their
opponent Candidate B will not stop fundraising and vice versa—the
solution is to have a statutory limit on expenditures.183 This, of course,
was held to be unconstitutional in both Buckley and in Randall. But if
the Court is really reconsidering preserving candidate time as a
compelling state interest, as argued should be the case in this Article, then
it should additionally reconsider the holdings in these two cases to allow
for expenditure limits in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
Long ago, in 1884, the Supreme Court recognized the need to protect
our democracy from corruption. As the Court said in Ex parte Yarbrough,
[i]n a republican government like ours, where political power
is reposed in representatives of the entire body of the people,
chosen at short intervals by popular elections, the temptations
to control these elections by violence and by corruption is a
constant source of danger . . . . no lover of his country can
shut his eyes to the fear of future danger from both sources.184
The risk of corruption continues, as privately funded elections leave
elected officials on the fundraising treadmill, just as Justice White
foretold in Buckley. This is not healthy for Members of Congress or for
effective legislating. However, changing this state of affairs will require
the Supreme Court to recognize that there is a problem with lawmakers
continually interrupting the work of governing to grovel for campaign
money. Furthermore, addressing candidates’ time should be considered
a compelling state interest worthy of solicitude from the Supreme Court.
By interrupting their primary task of lawmaking, fundraising may

182
Editorial Board, This Would Be A Nice First Step On Campaign Finance Reform,
WASH. POST (June 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/this-would-be-a-nic
ce-first-step-on-campaign-finance-reform/2016/06/10/745de05a-2e69-11e6-b5db-e9bc84a2
c8e4story.html?utm_term=.6b8002603709 (discussing the desirability of the Stop Act); Gov
Track, H.R. 4443 (114th): Stop Act, https://www.Govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/
hr4443 (noting that the Stop Act died).
183
Harold E. Ford & Jason M. Levien, A New Horizon for Campaign Finance Reform,
37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 319-20 (2000) (arguing that in a voluntary public financing
system, candidates’ expenditures must also be limited or they will not be encouraged to join
the public financing system); Hasen, supra note 1, at 35 (2014) (“Reformers must demonstrate
to the new Court that reasonable limits on corporate, and potentially even individual, spending
would not squelch political competition or inhibit robust political debate.”).
184
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1884).
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degrade the quality of Members’ legislative work.185 Thus, the Supreme
Court should take the issue of incumbent Members’ and sitting
Presidents’ fundraising more seriously because the constant interruptions
impedes and degrades the quality of our representative democracy. 186

185

See Jim Taylor, Technology: Myth of Multitasking, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 30, 2011),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-power-prime/201103/technology-mythmultitasking (Research on the American Psychological Association’s website offers evidence
that trying to multitask is not effective or efficient. It takes 40% more time to try and switch
tasks than to focus on a single task).
186
Jett, supra note 116, at 496 (discussing interruptions as intrusions).

